"I Will Do My Best to Remove the Differences"
	The new President says he wants to work with Washington, but insists only dialogue can defang Pyongyang

As South Korea's new President, Roh Moo Hyun finds himself in the middle of Asia's gravest security crisis in over a decade. While Washington, Tokyo and Seoul struggle to come together on a coherent and consistent policy toward North Korea, Roh must also placate a constituency that wants continued engagement with a potentially nuclear North. Four days before his swearing in, Roh met in the offices of his presidential transition team with Time Asia's editor Karl Taro Greenfeld, Seoul bureau chief Donald Macintyre and business correspondent Michael Schuman, admitting he was taking office at "a difficult moment." Here are excerpts:

Does a nuclear-armed North Korea frighten you?
Yes.

Why should South Korea continue to engage North Korea when so far the results have been disappointing—and we may have a nuclear-armed North Korea?
I myself and all of the Korean people are firmly against North Korea's nuclear possession. On the other hand, in the process of stopping North Korea from having nuclear weapons we should not cause war, and we're concerned about that possibility. I don't think there are any other credible alternatives to dialogue because sanctions and pressure tactics can cause war.

What about the U.S. position that dialogue with North Korea amounts to nuclear blackmail?
I understand the anger and the fear that the American people harbor against North Korea, especially after the 9/11 terror. And I also understand the sentiment of the North Koreans. This is not a moral evaluation or punishment problem but a cold, rational issue.

Which countries should be involved in solving the problem?
Japan, the U.S. and South Korea all have an interest in the North Korean problem. What is most important is how the Korean people view the seriousness of this problem. [In] 1994, we learned later that North Korea and the U.S. were on the brink of nuclear war. [In 1994, the last time a crisis erupted over North Korea's nuclear program, the Clinton Administration briefly considered a military strike to destroy Pyongyang's nuclear facilities.] And that would have meant a massive sacrifice on the part of Korean people. The ongoing process is too close, too similar to the process that went on in 1994.

How can you take both the military option and the sanctions option off the bargaining table?
I understand that my public statement that no military attack on North Korea is possible might limit the flexibility of the negotiation tactics toward North Korea, and I am concerned about this point. Therefore we need a closer cooperation and coordination with the United States government. As for the 1994 case, it left the Korean government very, very nervous.

What must be done to ensure that we will not have a nuclear-armed North Korea tomorrow?
I believe North Korea understands that you cannot both have nuclear weapons and opening up and economic prosperity at the same time. And I also believe that North Korea is aware that it must renounce its nuclear weapons in order to get a guarantee for international security and economic assistance. Chairman Kim Jong Il of the North has presented himself as the great leader in front of the North Korean people. I think that Chairman Kim Jong Il probably cannot appear defeated in the eyes of his people.

Will you continue the "Sunshine policy"?
I don't think there is a particular reason for my policy to be different from the former President's policy. I will try to improve the methodology by consulting with the opposition party and winning more approval of the people and increasing transparency of the process. Until I was elected I believed that the coordination between the U.S. and Korea was close, but after I was elected I found out myself that there have been some problems with the dialogue. I will do my best to remove the differences or disagreements. I heard that some people in the U.S. government are not satisfied with how [former President] Kim Dae Jung or myself are dealing with this situation, but please try to understand the following points—the situation was started by North Korea announcing its nuclear uranium-enrichment program. As the President-elect of Korea, I have been provided with the grounds that explains the likelihood that North Korea is undertaking the uranium project, but I have not received any firm evidence that it is actually going ahead with this. On the point of whether such a project exists or not, we respect the U.S. government opinion and follow it. Also, we have never questioned or denied the U.S. statement regarding the North Korean uranium-enrichment program. So there is no disagreement between our two countries except on the possibility of a military attack on North Korea. I think even our differences on this issue can be overcome through dialogue in the days to come. I don't think it's a good thing that the Americans are feeling regrets or are hurt that Korea is not following U.S. opinion on this situation.

Will the name of the "Sunshine Policy" change?
We will term it the "Peace and Prosperity Policy."

After five years of the "Sunshine policy," a lot of talking and a lot of money going to North Korea, is South Korea in a better security situation?
To better understand the achievements of the "Sunshine Policy" we have to think about what the consequences would have been if South Korea cut off dialogue and continued to exercise pressure on North Korea. Had we done so, North Korea would already have some nuclear weapons, or we would have faced a serious crisis, or the Korean people or other interested parties around the world would be living under a huge threat.

Do you have direct communications with North Korea? Can you reach high-level North Korean officials?
Not yet.

Is that a goal?
Yes.

Do you hope to have another summit with Kim Jong il or travel to North Korea?
I would like to keep all the possibilities open.

Do you expect U.S. troops in South Korea to be reduced or withdrawn?
I have made it very clear many times that I want the U.S. forces to remain in Korea. The U.S. forces in Korea will not be reduced or pulled out. If [Washington] has such a plan, I hope the U.S. will consult with the Korean authorities and I hope that the U.S. will try hard to convince the Korean people before proceeding with such a plan. I saw some articles from American newspapers saying that if Korean people don't want U.S. troops then they can leave, but I think that it is an inaccuracy. Even the people who demonstrated in candlelight vigils never said they wanted U.S. troops to leave the country.

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