Do Kosovo and other morally inspired interventions represent a new view of American interests after the cold war? "I think threats to our national interest come from a variety of problems, [including] the creation of chaos and instability that come about as a result of ethnic cleansing." How do we pick and choose such fights? Why Kosovo and not Rwanda? "I don't think you can make a very simple matrix. You have to look at the immensity of what is happening. I happen to believe, and argued so at the time, we should have done more in Rwanda. We get involved where the crime is huge, where it's in a region that affects our stability--the stability of Europe is something that has been essential to the U.S. for the last 200 years--and where there is an organization capable of dealing with it. Just because you can't act everywhere doesn't mean you don't act anywhere. We're evolving these rules. There's not a doctrine that really sets this forth in an organized way yet."
For someone so proud of being tough, she seems touchingly eager for approval, anxious about how the article on her will turn out. (Rest assured, I say, the pictures are good.) Yet both in her mind and heart, she betrays no self-doubt about her views. Madeleine's War? "Well, I don't think it's solely mine. But I feel that we did the right thing, and I am proud of the role I played in it." Now, after a week that advanced the possibility of peace, her challenge is to show that she is as good at getting out of a war as she is at getting into one.
With reporting by Douglas Waller/Washington
By the Numbers
500,000+ Number of miles she's flown since becoming Secretary of State
2 Number of years she lived in Belgrade
6 Number of languages she understands (Czech, English, French, Polish, Russian and Serbo-Croat)
4 Number of times she received the "teacher of the year" award at Georgetown University
Making Peace
At the start of the air war, NATO laid down five core demands. But last week, as the U.S. brought Russia on board, some of those "non-negotiable" points became more fluid.
1 THEN: Stop Serbian military action, violence and repression.
NOW: No change.
2 THEN: Withdraw all Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo.
NOW: Key word all was dropped, leaving it unclear if every one of Belgrade's soldiers has to get out, or only some of them.
3 THEN: Accept a NATO force stationed in Kosovo to protect the province's ethnic Albanians.
NOW: The key point. "NATO force" replaced by vague "effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the U.N." Uncertainty about the exact makeup of the force may give Milosevic enough wiggle room.
4 THEN: Allow unconditional, safe return of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced persons.
NOW: No change.
5 THEN: Grant autonomy to the Kosovo Albanians according to the Rambouillet agreement and disarm the troops of the K.L.A.
NOW: Instead of Rambouillet-style autonomy, the new agreement calls for a "framework" for "a substantial self-government" in Kosovo. The vague proposal leaves room for a compromise that can be sold to both Milosevic and the Albanians.
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