COVER STORY The Jihadis' Tale
The confessions of two Bali bombers tell of their hatred for the Westand their ties to Osama bin Laden
Terrorism's Missing Link
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, al-Qaeda's deadliest agent, is still at largeand more threatening than ever
Terror Inc.
The confessions of the Bali bombers offer a detailed picture of a terrorist network that spans Southeast Asia
Trail of Terror
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's fingerprints have appeared on a string of al-Qaeda's deadliest strikes
Bali in the Aftermath
Images of an island reeling from destruction and mourning loss
Brothers in Arms
The saga of the suspected Bali bomber shows that terror runs in the family (November 25, 2002)
Asia's Terror Kingpin
TIME pieces together the night of terror, a bloody reminder that no place is immune to terrorism (October 28, 2002)
The Jihadis' Tale page 4
JOINING THE HOLY WAR
Beyond detailing links to Al-Qaeda and revealing how JI operates, the confessions by Mukhlas and Samudra provide a rare window into how they became radicalized. There is a practical side to their being extremistsnetworking, planning and training for specific terrorist acts such as Bali's. But there's also an ideological dimensionseeing the world as a black-and-white universe that pits Muslims against nonbelievers, and interpreting Islam in their own way to justify their actions. Unlike, say, many Palestinians or Kashmiris who turn to militancy, neither Mukhlas nor Samudra hail from impoverished or oppressed backgrounds. Mukhlas went to university; Samudra won a government scholarship on graduating from high school. But instead of pursuing mainstream professional lives, they embraced Islamic militancy under the formative influence of their teachers and mentors.
Mukhlas studied at Abubakar's Islamic school in Solo, and Samudra credits a man named Jabir, who is a radical cleric and close friend of Hambali, with sharpening his Islamic belief. Mukhlas and Samudra were also shaped by their experience as jihadis in Afghanistan, the former in the late '80s and the latter in 1990 with al-Qaeda, which honed an acute sense that Muslims everywherefrom Afghanistan to Bosnia to the Middle Eastare persecuted by the West. While most Muslims interpret jihad as a daily personal and spiritual battle to be and do good, Mukhlas and Samudra speak of an "offensive" and "frontal" jihad. Indeed, in his confession, Samudra suggests with some frustration that even JI leaders such as Abubakar are too yielding. "I carry out jihad," says Samudra, "because it's the duty of a Muslim to avenge, so [that] the American terrorists and their allies understand that the blood of the Muslim community is not shed for nothing."
An integral part of this duty is the idea of syahiddying a martyr's death. In his confession, Samudra says he was happy to die himself as part of the Bali attack but was pre-empted by other volunteers. He asserts that Iqbal, a JI foot soldier tasked with carrying the bomb that exploded in Paddy's Irish Pub on Oct. 12, took part in the operation with the full intent of becoming a suicide bomber, even leaving behind a will directed at "all Muslims," which Samudra planned to post on the Internet. Iqbal's action would make him the first recorded suicide bomber in Southeast Asia. An account by a witness to the Paddy's blast raises questions, however, about Iqbal's commitment: it describes how he initially tried to leave a package behind in the bar's toilet, only to return and retrieve it after it was pointed out to him.
Of course, the chief goal of JI operatives like Samudra, Iqbal and Mukhlas is to kill others. That stark truth is underscored in Mukhlas' confession by a list of materials recovered when police arrested him at a hideout in a small village in East Java. Along with several guns, officers also found books, pamphlets and maps that Mukhlas had apparently decided to take with him even on the run. These cherished volumes included The Terrorist's Handbook, How to Manufacture Poisons and How to Make a Bomb, which featured sections on topics like using mobile phones for remote-controlled detonationthe method employed in the biggest explosion in Kuta.
Most disturbing of all, Mukhlas' library shows how carefully organized and entrenched JI's terror network has become. Among his books was a text entitled Year 2000 Military Training Report. Written by a regional JI commander for his superior, it contains such details as the grades achieved by each trainee on the firing range. Mukhlas, like many fellow jihadis, also kept near him another seminal work, the Guide Book to the Cause of Jemaah Islamiah, Volume II: the Directives of Struggle, which outlines the group's aims and tactics. First published in 1996, it underscores how long and patiently JI's leaders have labored to build up the group.
It is possible, of course, that the Indonesian investigators have "hit JI in the heart," says a senior U.S. official in Jakarta, "but maybe that's wishful thinking ... How much is still out there that we don't know about? What is not coming out of the interrogations?" These are questions nobody can answer with any certainty. But the confessions of Samudra and Mukhlas provide a rare glimpse of an organization whose reach and professionalism outstrips what anyone had previously