Her Other Problem — page 3

Should Manila publicly acknowledge the existence of JI camps in territory controlled by the MILF, as Arroyo herself notes, it would have little choice but to immediately launch a major military operation to close them down. That would destroy any chance of achieving a peace settlement, something the President regards as a vital part of her legacy, says Andrew Tan, who lectures on regional politics at Singapore's Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS). Nor is it simply a matter of presidential pride. The country's economic development will remain hobbled until foreign investors judge the security situation to be stable, analysts point out. Arroyo's military—already stretched thin, underfunded and once again a hotbed of coup rumors—also needs to disengage from the MILF to deal with a growing threat from the resurgent communist New People's Army.

Similarly, the MILF has no desire to be further branded a supporter of JI and, by extension, JI's ally and sometime sponsor, al-Qaeda. MILF leaders are aware that Arroyo returned from Washington in June with a promise of $356 million in military aid for her role in combating terrorism, money that could end up as bombs and shells raining down on MILF guerrillas. And there is a carrot as well as a stick for the group: the U.S. is offering a so-called mini Marshall Plan if peace talks are concluded successfully—some $30 million in aid for Mindanao this year and a promise of more to come.

In his confession, Muklis makes repeated and often self-contradictory attempts to distance himself from the MILF leadership. He portrays himself as having being effectively expelled from the group after his involvement in the Christmas 2000 Manila bombing "because they heard I became a terrorist." He insists MILF overlord Hashim Salamat knew nothing about the new bombing campaign in Manila. And yet Muklis continued to actively train new recruits and participate in MILF actions such as an attack in April this year in Maigo in Lanao del Norte, which left about a dozen civilians dead—making his claims that he was in exile ring hollow. Philippine officials also believe that the MILF remains a broadly united organization and that rogue or breakaway elements are unlikely to be behind the terror incidents. Says armed forces Chief of Staff, General Narciso Abaya: "Divisions over strategy notwithstanding, Salamat still has the ascendancy over other top leaders."

The MILF may have been ambivalent about Muklis' notoriety, says terrorism expert Abuza, but it is unlikely the MILF would have rid itself of such a prized asset. The group's leadership has seen numerous other peace talks come and go and remains adamant that it wants full independence, not simply autonomy—a position Manila is extremely unlikely to accommodate, according to IDSS's Andrew Tan. The MILF "simply doesn't trust the government," as Abuza puts it. And that means the MILF "want to keep a terrorist option in [its] toolbox"—an option someone in the group was exercising with vengeance when Muklis was dispatched on his mission of death to Manila. The MILF, it seems, believes in Teddy Roosevelt's dictum: "Speak softly but carry a big stick." That might have been a good policy for 20th century America, but it bodes evil for the intentions of a group that now claims it wants peace.

With reporting by Anthony Davis, Michael Schuman and Nelly Sindayen/Manila and Jason Tedjasukmana/Jakarta

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	Terrorism Released [July 21, 2003] Criticism falls on Manila's security apparatus as JI bombmaker escapes First Bali, now Davao [March 13, 2003] The bombing at an airport in the Philippines shows the threat that terrorists still pose in Asia The Philippines' Terrorist Refuge [February 17, 2003] Mindanao's Islamic separatists are back to harboring and training the region's terrorists The Long Goodbye [January 6, 2003] Arroyo vows to step aside in 2004, but the Philippine President's self-sacrifice might backfire More Related Items | Search all issues of TIME Magazine