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 Scenes from a Coup
Photographer Philip Blenkinsop takes to the streets of Bangkok as the tanks roll in
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Dark Days for Democracy—Page 2
The coup had been executed with soldierly precision, but it's the dark side of martial rigor that's provoking concern. "The military may be good at fighting, but it may not be good at administration or governance," says Somchai Homlaor, secretary-general of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development in Bangkok. "We don't want to escape from the tiger only to end up with the crocodile." Governance in Thailand has never been just about the tiger and the crocodile. Unlike in the West, where checks and balances on the abuse of power exist within the democratic system, the corrective mechanism in Thai government has tended to come from outside, usually through military intervention. Refereeing this tug of war between officials and officers is the country's beloved 78-year-old constitutional monarch King Bhumibol Adulyadej, whose every whisper is dissected for political meaning and carries the weight of divine mandate. Last Wednesday, he made himself clear, endorsing the new rulers and asking the populace to obey their orders. The night of the coup, Sonthi had already signaled his loyalty to the King by arming his soldiers with yellow ribbons—the color associated with the monarch—that were tied around the muzzles of their rifles.
Such fealty to the King contrasted with mounting criticism in recent months that Thaksin had burnished his reputation at the monarch's expense. The former Prime Minister's rural-relief programs, for instance, vied for attention with the King's agricultural pet projects. Then, over the summer, Thaksin complained that "a charismatic figure"—widely interpreted to be either the King or his top adviser Prem Tinsulanonda—was trying to force him out of office. Although Thaksin ranks as the most popular Prime Minister in Thai history—he was swept into office a record three times courtesy of his rural power base—the Bangkok élite resented what they perceived as a lèse majesté attack. Last week, the six coup leaders—four military chiefs, the national police boss and the head of the National Security Council—went on to accuse Thaksin of using his position to enrich himself and his supporters; they also claimed he was eroding the very democratic institutions that should have limited his power. Certainly, Thaksin had taken advantage of the country's 1997 constitution—which strengthened the executive branch's authority—to fill the electoral commission, courts and other supposedly independent institutions with his associates. Thailand's democratically elected leader also allegedly used his position to pressure journalists, academics and even bankers who released pessimistic economic forecasts.
Careful cultivation of power is hardly unusual for a Thai leader, but Thaksin erred by alienating a competing power structure: the military. Having trained with the army before joining the police and later refashioning himself as an entrepreneur, Thaksin promoted many fellow members of his cadet class to key military positions, leapfrogging more veteran officers. His priority after returning from abroad was to oversee a military reshuffle slated for this month or next; the changes could have sidelined Sonthi and his acolytes before an election later this year that Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party was widely expected to win. The timing of the army putsch may well have hinged on preventing the military reordering, as well as pre-empting violence during Wednesday's scheduled rallies. Two of Thaksin's deputy ministers, who were detained by the CDR late last week, are suspected of planning to bus in pro-Thaksin masses to Bangkok in hopes of engineering a violent confrontation with anti-PM protestors. "We're sorry that it came to a coup," Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva told TIME a day before the ban on political commentary was announced. "But this proves that Thaksin has been destroying the democratic fabric of Thailand."
But is a military junta really the best way to repair the fabric of democracy? Sonthi has promised to hold fresh elections, though not for at least another year. Within two weeks, he said, the CDR would install an interim Prime Minister and begin drafting a new constitution to sew up the loopholes Thaksin exploited. Whom the generals choose—and how much autonomy he's allowed—may dictate whether the coup will be regarded by Thais as a necessary evil or just a power grab by ambitious generals. So far, candidates for the caretaker job include: Supachai Panitchpakdi, former head of the World Trade Organization; the Supreme Administrative Court president Ackaratorn Chularat; central-bank governor Pridiyathorn Devakula; and Chatumongkol Sonakul, a past central-bank governor. With the economy already slowing, much is riding on the generals' choice. "Thailand has to pick someone who meets international standards," says Sompop Manarangsan, a political economist at Chulalongkorn University. "If it doesn't, our economy will be affected because any instability gives foreign investment a reason to look elsewhere."
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