SEPTEMBER 6, 1999 VOL. 154 NO. 9

The Path Toward Peace
Megawati and the army must accept that East Timor isn't Indonesia's
By JEFFREY A. WINTERS

After months of uncertainty over the fate of East Timor, the following scenario now seems likely: Timorese will vote overwhelmingly for independence; Megawati Sukarnoputri will become Indonesia's president in November; the military will continue to use violence to poison the situation in East Timor; foreign forces will be deployed to carry out the referendum's mandate. It is a complicated picture that will severely test the quality of statesmanship in Asia and beyond.

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	Indonesia and East Timor

So far, the track record of nearly everyone involved is poor. But the vote scheduled for this week presents an opportunity for all of the players to finish well, and there is ample justification for both optimism and caution. In the leadup to the referendum, the vast majority of East Timor's people conducted themselves with restraint and dignity. This bodes well for a peaceful future. Last week Xanana Gusmão, the Timorese leader currently under house arrest, showed genuine statesmanship in calling for peace after the referendum and proposing a blanket amnesty for anyone involved in atrocities against his people. Indonesia's President B.J. Habibie has also generated optimism by upholding his commitment to allow the referendum and by announcing last week that Gusmão would soon be released. Habibie and his advisers deserve credit, particularly because Indonesia's military leaders oppose such moves.

More worrisome are the positions of Megawati and the army. Megawati is so consumed by domestic matters, especially with holding the country together, that she has trouble appreciating that East Timor is an occupied territory that has little in common with the other regions agitating for greater autonomy from Jakarta. She has consistently misread the warm receptions she receives in East Timor, just as the Timorese have consistently misread Megawati. Pro-independence activists, especially the younger ones, have long viewed Megawati as someone who would help bring them freedom. When Megawati's entourage campaigned in Dili during national elections last June, her handlers expected the masses who assembled at a stadium to join her in singing the Indonesian national anthem. That's tantamount to expecting slaves in the American South to sing Dixie. When I asked Megawati just afterward if she had noticed that not a mouth in the crowd had moved, she conceded: "It was hard not to notice."

Megawati was bold and statesmanlike in a speech last July, in which she stated clearly and for the first time that she would accept the results of the referendum. She also said that the demand for independence in Timor was unique and not an option for any other part of the archipelago. But in the same breath she muddled the message by attacking as unconstitutional Habibie's stunning move last January to permit Timor to organize the referendum that is taking place this week. And when she visited Dili last week she shocked the international community by criticizing the United Nations Mission in East Timor as biased in favor of Timorese independence, while saying nothing about the violence unleashed by Indonesia's military through its militia.

As the person who will likely lead Indonesia for the next five to 10 years, Megawati is justified in her concerns about centrifugal forces. But it is unacceptable to penalize the Timorese for Suharto's three decades of regionally divisive rule. If Megawati could concede that East Timor was never legitimately Indonesia's 27th province, it would be much easier for her to accept that it never will be.

Indonesia's armed forces remain the greatest obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the Timor conflict. By arming and funding the civilian militia, the military has been able to position itself as a disinterested peacekeeper between rival East Timorese forces. But whether by proxy or directly, the army has proven beyond any doubt that it cannot be entrusted with the task of maintaining peace and stability in East Timor. And the military is not likely to stop its campaign of terror after the votes are counted.

Since Indonesia has blown the chance to be a peacekeeper, the international community must bear responsibility for ensuring peace in East Timor. This will be a critical test of international statesmanship. Apart from the normal questions of costs and logistics, there is the diplomatic obstacle posed by China, which is suspicious of international military actions so close to home. Beijing should be sent an unequivocal message that the question is not if international forces will be deployed, but only how and by whom.

The ideal arrangement in East Timor would involve creating a United Nations peacekeeping force with Chinese participation and support, or at least without Beijing's opposition. Even if China blocks the U.N. option, it would be proper and responsible for the United States and Australia to move forward jointly. As these options are explored, it is worth remembering that it was the unyielding resistance of the Timorese that made this historic opportunity for freedom possible. They have also given others around the world who failed East Timor in the past a second chance to show what statesmanship can achieve.

Jeffrey A. Winters, a professor of political economy at Northwestern University in the U.S., is the author of Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State