OCTOBER 25, 1999 VOL. 154 NO. 16

This Honeymoon Won't Last
True, many Pakistanis welcomed the coup. But they'll soon want results
By TERESITA C. SCHAFFER

Troops guarding airports and television stations, a Prime Minister in "protective custody," the Chief of Army Staff announcing that he has taken over: the news from Pakistan looks like a replay of an old movie. It was a disappointing end to a disappointing government.

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Pakistanis' disillusionment with the democracy of the past 11 years--following more than a decade of the military-led government of Zia ul-Haq--runs deep and has been growing fast. The country faces a daunting list of problems. National institutions like the civil service have corroded. Corruption has eaten away at the basic processes of government. Sectarian strife and urban violence plague parts of the country, aggravated by loosely structured Islamic organizations returning from the fight in Afghanistan. Tax evasion, sagging government revenues and excessive short-term foreign debt have devastated the nation's finances. Long-term social problems, like high population growth and widespread illiteracy, have gone untended, casualties of the government's cash crunch. Perhaps most worrisome is the disaffection in Pakistan's smaller provinces at what locals consider domination by Punjab. As much as a year ago, many Pakistanis were ruefully concluding that democratic government couldn't deliver the goods.

Two more immediate issues probably led General Pervez Musharraf to act. The first was the army's unhappiness at having been made to withdraw from the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kargil after last summer's incursion. The United States and other countries pressed Pakistan to end the fighting and bring the forces home. As this pressure was applied, Prime Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif correctly concluded that Pakistan's position in Kargil was untenable in light of the country's larger interests. The army obeyed his order to pull out and could probably have resolved its policy problems within the existing government structure. The last straw, however, was the Prime Minister's decision to sack General Musharraf, replacing him with a more "political" general. The army establishment, seeing this as an attack on its integrity, made its move.

The army chief has declared himself Chief Executive, suspended the constitution and parliament, and instituted the practical equivalent of martial law. But he has left his long-term plans unclear. Pakistan's long experience with army regimes suggests that, beyond a brief honeymoon period, they have a bad effect on both army and country. Musharraf urgently needs to turn over real authority to civilians--as he may have tried to do during the coup's first three days. Asking the parliament to choose a new prime minister, attractive as that may seem to frustrated friends of democracy, is probably not an option. More realistic is a transition government, ideally including some members with a political background that has kept them in touch with ordinary people.

Whatever its form, the new government must stabilize the country's finances, strengthen law and order, prosecute corruption in an even-handed way and begin rebuilding national institutions. The financial task will be complicated by aid cutoffs from foreign donors dismayed by the coup. Dealing with India will be difficult, but real progress would have been a tall order even before Sharif's departure. The promise of Sharif's meeting in Lahore last February with his Indian counterpart gave way to the guns of Kargil, leaving India's leaders feeling betrayed and Pakistan's feeling vulnerable. The prerequisite for an India-Pakistan dialogue remains unchanged: both countries' leaders must put their personal prestige into the effort and convince one another they will fulfill their promises. The best way for Pakistan to meet this test, and to reassure the outside world that it will avoid risky military adventures, would be to crack down on infiltration into the Indian-held parts of Kashmir. That would put the onus on India to respond constructively.

Pakistan's new leaders will eventually need to acquire and embody legitimacy. If experience is any guide, the initial popular relief at the army coup will not last long. The country will begin looking for both performance and political standing. Pakistan's problems require not just administrative skill, but also acknowledged national leadership. Islamabad needs to establish representative organs to improve the frayed relations among the country's provinces. Moreover, Pakistan faces several years of difficult economic reform. Carrying the country through this process requires both strong leadership and institutions through which people can express their views.

This is where the road back to democracy comes in. It's not just a fashionable Western luxury. Even if the military leaders hold a referendum ratifying their initial move, there must also be a timetable leading to real elections for a real parliament. This alone can confer the political legitimacy Pakistan's leaders need over the long haul. The last few elected governments' failures of governance and leadership cost them their legitimacy. That is Pakistan's tragedy. It could happen again.

Teresita C. Schaffer, a retired U.S. ambassador with long service in South Asia, is director for South Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.