IRAQ

No Early Return for U.S. Troops Fighting in Iraq

An upsurge in violence signals the insurgency's growing confidence

By Tony Karon

Almost four months after an election that held so much promise, the outlook for U.S. forces in Iraq is taking a turn for the worse. In the first half of May alone, more than 50 U.S. troops were killed in Iraq. (Almost 600 Iraqis died in the same period.) U.S. forces are hitting back, to be sure, having launched a new surprise operation in Western Iraq deploying 1,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops to target the insurgents in their heartland. But as May shapes up as a strong contender for the deadliest month for U.S. forces in the past year, worse news comes from the sober assessment of one of the most respected—and U.S.-supportive—strategic think tanks in Europe.

It is now conventional wisdom among U.S. officials that the key to defeating the insurgency is giving the Sunnis a greater political stake in the new order.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which hosted President Bush during his last visit to London, now warns that it will take five or six years before the Iraqi security forces being built by the U.S. are close to being capable of imposing and guaranteeing order in Iraq.

An IISS expert estimated that there were some 1,000 foreign fighters in Iraq, out of a total force of hardcore insurgent fighters believed to number up to 20,000. The bulk of the insurgency, however, draws its momentum not from Osama bin Laden's global jihad against America, but from the alienation and hostility toward the new Iraqi order and its U.S. sponsor pervasive in Iraq's once-dominant Sunni Arab minority. It is now conventional wisdom among U.S. officials that the key to defeating the insurgency is giving the Sunnis a greater political stake in the new order. There were positive indicators in that respect in recent days, when some 1,000 Sunni leaders gathered to coordinate their activities in search of a greater political role, particularly in the writing of Iraq's new constitution. The gathering's final statement condemned terror attacks on Iraqi civilians, but proclaimed that "resisting the occupier is a legitimate right." The speaker of Iraq's new parliament, Hajem al-Hasani, was even more explicit, calling for those fighting the U.S. forces to be given a direct political role via the formation of a political wing.

Fears of full-blown sectarian warfare between Shiites and Sunnis, meanwhile, have prompted urgent mediation efforts by, among others, the firebrand Shiite maverick Moqtada Sadr. His efforts are based on articulating a common nationalist agenda, specifically by demanding a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. The call for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal had been a key election promise of Jaafari's coalition. The problem, of course, is that the new government is all too aware of its dependence on U.S. forces for its own security and survival, and is unlikely to pursue a timetable for withdrawal as long as they fear the consequences. But that perspective isn't necessarily shared by the new government's own political base, and that's a discrepancy Sadr will seek to work to his own advantage.

Another sobering reality is making matters even more complicated. While the evidence is increasingly suggesting that the U.S. deployment in Iraq may have to continue for six years or longer, it's far from clear that the new government can sell that idea to its own support base. —from TIME, May 25, 2005

Questions

1. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, how long will it take until Iraqi forces are able to ensure the country's security?

2. What are U.S. officials saying is the key to defeating the insurgency in Iraq?

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