In the early days of our nato commitment in Bosnia, an Allied officer came to me and said, "Sir, we believe that [Serbian war criminal] Radovan Karadzic may have driven past our positions—but we aren't sure." That is a small foretaste of what is to come. It is difficult to direct military operations against specific individuals. For the Pentagon leadership, this isn't the war we trained to fight. It requires a fresh strategy, enhanced forces, new weapons and a changed attitude. The strategy—to attack the network of international terrorists and the governments or organizations that support them—will be based on deadly accurate police work. Force will be used only as necessary, for we are not terrorists and do not intend to strike innocent civilians.

This strategy requires attention to a whole range of intelligence- gathering methods that have taken second—or last—priority for years. We need face-to-face information collection: Who are these people, what are their intentions, and what can be done to disrupt their plans and arrest them? Technology is still important—night-vision gear, small handheld devices that monitor conversations and confirm identities—but more crucial will be a willingness to risk our personnel. Military intelligence will send our people into hostile situations under cover or with limited backup.

Most likely we will need more special-operations forces and not so many artillery outfits; more self- contained operational forces and less logistical backup. We will want to go in quick and light, with minimal time for planning and deployment, and the smallest possible footprint. We will need lighter-weight communications with longer-lasting batteries and new small arms effective at close quarters and longer ranges. We want to pack our punch into smaller, more mobile packages. If we need heavy firepower, we want to call it down from the sky rather than backpack it in. We will be putting our people in harm's way, facing off against what has been an implacable enemy. We cannot expect success without taking casualties.

The Air Force is well prepared with long-range, precision strike capabilities that have already been proved in battle in Kosovo. And if the targets can be identified, then long-range strikes to disrupt terrorist activities may be warranted. But the resistance of a fanatic foe may be overcome only by boots on the ground. We will need enhanced air-transport capabilities and a reorganized and re-equipped ground force. But the most important transformation may be one of attitude. After Vietnam, the U.S. has become extremely sensitive to casualties. Of all the obstacles the generals are facing, this may be the most difficult.