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| BJORNBAKK JAN-MORTEN / AFP / GETTY |
| ON THE LOOSE:
Sites like this nuclear-waste depository in Russia's Murmansk region remain vulnerable to theft
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| The Other Nuke Nightmare |
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The ultimate worst case scenario, al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear bomb in a U.S. city |
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By MASSIMO CALABRESI |
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Posted Sunday, February 6, 2005
Among U.S. counterterrorism officials, it is the ultimate nightmare
scenario: al-Qaeda detonating a nuclear bomb in a U.S. city. Osama
bin Laden says it is a religious duty to obtain a bomb, and most
experts believe that if al-Qaeda were to succeed, the group wouldn't
hesitate to use it. Though building even a crude nuclear weapon is
time consuming, the wide availability of raw material and scientific
expertise means that it is plausible for terrorists someday to get
their hands on one. "The simplest nuclear bomb," says Ivan Oelrich,
director of the security project at the Federation of American
Scientists, "is very simple indeed."
The biggest hurdle is getting the material that causes the
nuclear explosion. For a basic nuclear weapon, terrorists would need
about 100 lbs. of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium (HEU).
Fortunately, manufacturing HEU is extremely difficult. Refining it
requires vast industrial facilities, top-flight
engineers and the kinds of resources available to a government but
not to rogue
terrorist groups. Unfortunately, many states have already done the
hard work, creating 1,800 tons of HEU that is housed at
research facilities, weapons depots and other storage sites in as
many as 24 countries, according to William Potter, director of
nonproliferation
studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Of
greatest concern is the more than 300 tons of HEU in the former
Soviet Union. Some of the material may have already gone missing:
since 1991, there have been seven attempted thefts reported of small
amounts of bomb-grade material and more than 700 reported thefts of
unrefined nuclear material. In Chelyabinsk, Russia, in 1998, Russian
intelligence uncovered a plot by employees at a nuclear facility in
the region to smuggle out 40 lbs. of HEU for sale on the black
market.
With sufficient fissile material in hand, a trained engineer could
build a crude device without too much difficulty. The most basic
design is that of the Hiroshima bomb, which fired two pieces of HEU
at each other from opposite ends of an artillery tube. The bomb could
be assembled at a basic machine shop and would fit in the back of a
truck. If smuggled into the U.S. and detonated in a major
metropolitan area, such a weapon could kill hundreds of thousands.
Not everyone believes the danger is imminent. Last August, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov dismissed concerns about the security
of Russian HEU as "just a myth." However big the threat, critics say
President Bush has yet to tackle it head-on.
"The Bush Administration has failed to declare war on nuclear
terrorism," says nuclear expert Graham Allison, a former Clinton
official. The Bush Administration is expected to earmark about $400
million this year for securing nuclear material in the former Soviet
Union. Over the past two and a half years, international teams of
nuclear experts have retrieved more than 230 lbs. of bomb-grade
uranium from such countries as Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Romania, Libya
and the Czech Republic. But at its current pace, Allison charges, the
effort to secure all Russian nuclear weapons and fissile material
will not be complete until 2020. Critics of the Administration say
the U.S. should pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to get more
aggressive about securing nuclear material in his country. "We're in
a race between cooperation and catastrophe," says former Senator Sam
Nunn, who helped create the
13-year-old U.S.-Russian program to destroy Russia's surplus HEU
before it falls into the wrong hands.
The world may not have much time. In the months before Sept. 11, bin
Laden and associates met in Afghanistan with a Pakistani nuclear
scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmoud. At one meeting, according to
an account made public by the White House, a
bin Laden associate indicated
he had nuclear material and wanted to know how to use it to make a
weapon. Mahmoud provided information about nuclear-weapons programs,
the White House said. In an interview with the Associated Press,
Mahmoud's son said
his father had rebuffed bin Laden. The bad news is
that he is surely still
trying.
With reporting by Timothy J. Burger
and Elaine Shannon/Washington, Tim McGirk/Islamabad and
Andrew Purvis/Vienna
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