HYDE: I thank the gentleman. Today, our witness is Judge
Kenneth W. Starr.
On August 5th, 1994, the Special Division of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
appointed Judge Starr to investigate what has become known as
the Whitewater matter. Since that time, Attorney General Reno
and the Special Division added several other matters, including
the White House Travel Office and the FBI files matters to Judge
Starr's jurisdiction.
After his submission of evidence, they further added what has
become known as the Lewinsky matter.
Judge Starr has a bachelor's degree from the George
Washington University, a master's degree from Brown University
and a juris doctor degree from Duke University.
He then clerked for Judge David Dyer (ph) of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and Chief Justice
Warren Burger of the Supreme Court of the United States.
After serving on President Reagan's transition team, Judge
Starr served as counselor to Attorney General William French
Smith from 1981 to 1983. In 1983, President Reagan nominated
him tneral of the
United States. As solicitor general, Judge Starr was responsible
for representing the United States before the Supreme Court.
In November 1993, Democrats on the Senate Ethics Committee
chose him to serve as a hearing examiner to review Senator
Packwood's diaries for relevant information.
Since August 1994, Judge Starr has conducted the
investigation of Whitewater and the other matters that have been
assigned to him by Attorney General Reno and the Special
Division.
That investigation has led to the conviction of 14 persons,
including a sitting governor of Arkansas, in two separate cases;
the former No. 3 person in the United States Department of
Justice; and two former business partners of the president. Six
other indictments are currently pending in the courts.
HYDE: More pertinent to today's hearing, Judge Starr's
investigation has led to the first-ever impeachment referral
under section 595(c) of the independent counsel statute. That
referral has given rise to the impeachment inquiry we are now
conducting.
With that, Judge Starr, would you please rise so I may
administer the oath?
Mr. Starr, do you swear that the testimony you are about to
give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
STARR: I do.
HYDE: Thank you.
Let the record reflect the witness responded in the
affirmative.
And Mr. Starr, you may proceed.
STARR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity to be before the committee.
This...
HYDE: Is your mike on?
(UNKNOWN): You need to pull it closer.
STARR: I was just told to push it away.
(UNKNOWN) Some Democrat told you that.
(LAUGHTER)
HYDE: I'm sure that may have been Mr. Delahunt.
(LAUGHTER)
STARR: The person did not identify his affiliation in saying
that.
But this is my first opportunity to publicly report on
certain issues and aspects of our work, and I look forward to
doing so and seeking to assist the committee.
I appreciate both the seriousness of the committee's work and
the gravity of its assignment. I have reviewed the statements
made by the 37 members at the October 5 hearing.
Any citizen who watched that hearing would have been
impressed by the depth and the breadth of the discussion that
day, and...
(UNKNOWN): Mr. Chairman, I apologize for interrupting Judge
Starr.
But Judge, could you pull the mike a little closer?
(UNKNOWN): Yes, I'll keep...
RANGEL: Pull it.
STARR: So I appear before you today in the wake of your own
hearings, both on October 5 and in the hearings to which the
chair just referred, with great respect and awareness of the
difficulty of your task.
As you know, in January of this year, and as the chairman
indicated, the attorney general of the United States petitioned
the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for
this jurisdiction, the panel that oversees independent counsels.
And at the attorney general's request, the special division
granted authority to us to investigate whether Monica Lewinsky
or others committed federal crimes relating to the sexual
harassment lawsuit brought by Paula Jones against the president.
Our office conducted a swift yet thorough investigation. We
completed the primary factual investigation in under eight
months, notwithstanding a number of obstacles in our path.
The law requires, as the chairman indicated, an independent
counsel to report to the House of Representatives substantial
and credible information that an impeachable offense may have
been committed.
On September 9, pursuant to our statutory duty, we submitted
a referral, and we submitted backup documentation to the House,
as Mr. Conyers has noted. I am here today at your invitation in
furtherance of our statutory obligation.
Let me say at the outset that I recognize that it is the
House of Representatives -- and not an independent counsel --
which enjoys the sole power to impeach. My role today is to
discuss our referral and the underlying investigation.
Let me then begin with an overview. As our referral
explains, the evidence suggests that the president made false
statements under oath and thwarted the search for truth in Jones
versus Clinton. The evidence further suggests that the
president made false statements under oath to the grand jury on
August 17 of this year. That same night, the president publicly
acknowledged an inappropriate relationship, but maintained that
his testimony had been legally accurate. The president also
declared that all inquiries into the matter should end, because,
he said, it was private.
But shortly after the president's August 17 speech, Senators
Lieberman, Kerrey and Moynihan stated that the president's
actions were not a private matter. In our view, they were
correct.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the president repeatedly
tried to thwart the legal process in the Jones matter and in the
grand jury investigation. That is not a private matter.
The evidence further suggests that the president in the
course of those efforts misused his authority and his power as
president and contravened his duty to faithfully execute the
laws. That, too, is not a private matter.
Closer still? OK. There's noise in the hall, so I will
continue to try to speak up and into the mike. OK.
The evidence suggests that the misuse of presidential
authority occurred in the following 10 ways.
First, the evidence suggests that the president made
a series of premeditated false statements in his civil
deposition on January 17, 1998. Those were statements under
oath. The president had taken an oath to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
By making false statements under oath, the president, the
chief executive of our nation, failed to adhere to that oath and
to his presidential oath to faithfully execute the laws.
Second, the evidence suggests that apart from making false
statements under oath, the president engaged in a pattern -- a
pattern of behavior du Jones' case was
proceeding and Ms. Lewinsky's truthful testimony would have been
harmful.
He engaged in an apparent scheme to conceal gifts that had
been subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky. He coached a potential
witness, his own secretary, Mrs. Currie, with a false account of
relevant events.
Those acts constitute a pattern of obstruction that is
fundamentally inconsistent with the president's duty to
faithfully execute the law.
Third, the evidence suggests that the president participated
in a scheme at his civil deposition in which his attorney, in
his presence, deceived a United States district judge in an
effort to cut off questioning about Ms. Lewinsky.
The president did not correct his attorney's
statement.
A false statement to a federal judge in order to shortcut and
to prevent relevant questioning is an obstruction of the
judicial process.
Fourth. The evidence suggests that on January 23, 1998,
after the criminal investigation had become public, the
president made false statements to his Cabinet and used his
Cabinet as unwitting surrogates to publicly support the
president's false story.
Fifth. The evidence suggests that the president, acting in a
premeditated and calculated fashion, deceived the American
people on January 26 and on other occasions when he denied a
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
Sixth. The evidence suggests that the president, after the
criminal investigation became public, made false statements to
his aides and concocted false alibis that these government
employees repeated to the grand jury sitting at the United
States courthouse. As a result, the grand jury here in
Washington received inaccurate information.
Seventh. Having promised the American people to cooperate
with the investigation, the president refused six invitations to
testify before the grand jury. Refusing to cooperate with a
duly authorized federal criminal investigation is inconsistent
with the general statutory duty of all executive branch
employees to cooperate with criminal investigations. It also is
inconsistent with the president's duty to faithfully execute the
laws.
Eighth. The president and his administration asserted three
different governmental privileges to conceal relevant
information from the grand jury. The privilege assertions were
legally baseless in these circumstances.
They were inconsistent with the actions of Presidents
Carter and Reagan in similar circumstances, and they delayed and
impeded the investigation.
Ninth. The president made false statements under oath to the
grand jury on August 17, 1998. The president again took an oath
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
The evidence demonstrates that the president failed to adhere to
that oath and thus to his presidential oath to faithfully
execute the laws.
Tenth. The evidence suggests that the president deceived the
American peopls foreseeable, even likely,
that she would be a witness in the Jones case.
And the president used a governmental attorney, Bruce
Lindsey, to assist his personal legal defense during the Jones
case.
In short, the evidence suggests that the president repeatedly
used the machinery of government and the powers of his high
office to conceal his relationship -- to conceal the
relationship from the American people; from the judicial process
in the Jones case; and from the grand jury.
Let me turn, then, to the legal context in which these issues
first arose. At the outset, I want to emphasize that our
referral never suggests that the relationship between the
president and Ms. Lewinsky, in and of itself, could constitute a
high crime or misdemeanor. Indeed, the referral never passes
judgment on the president's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The
propriety of a relationship is not the concern of our office.
The referral is instead about obstruction of justice, lying
under oath, tampering with witnesses and the misuse of power.
The referral cannot be understood without appreciating this
vital distinction.
This case or matter thus raises the following initial
question: Is a plaintiff in a sexual harassment lawsuit entitled
to obtain truthful information from the defendant and from
associates of the defendant in order to support her claim? That
should be easy to answer.
No citizen who finds himself accused in a sexual
harassment case, or in any other kind of case, can lie under
oath or otherwise obstruct justice and thereby prevent the
plaintiff from discovering evidence and presenting her case.
Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a
federal sexual harassment suit against President Clinton in
1994. The president denied those allegations. We will never
know whether a jury would have credited the allegations. We
also will never know whether the ultimate decision-maker would
have found that the alleged facts, if true, constitute sexual
harassment. When the president and Ms. Jones settled the case
last week, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in St. Louis,
was still considering the preliminary legal question whether the
facts as alleged could constitute sexual harassment.
After the suit was first filed in 1994, the president
attempted to delay the trial or more broadly the proceedings,
until his presidency had concluded. The president claimed a
temporary presidential immunity from civil suit. And the case
proceeded to the Supreme Court of the United States. At oral
argument, the president's attorney specifically warned our
nation's highest court.
But if Ms. Jones prevailed, her lawyers would be able
to investigate the president's relationships with other women as
is common in sexual harassment cases.
The Supreme Court rejected the president's constitutional
claim of immunity and did so by a nine to zero vote. The court
concluded that the Constitution did not provide such a temporary
immunity from suit. The idea was simple and powerful: No one
is above the law. The Supreme Court sent the case back to trial
with words that warrant emphasis. These are the words of our
unanimous Supreme Court. "Like every other citizen who
invokes" the District Court's jurisdiction, Ms. Jones -- the
words of the court again "has a right to an orderly disposition
of her claims."
After the Supreme Court's decision, the parties started to
gather the facts. The parties questioned relevant witnesses in
depositions. They submitted written questions. They made
requests for documents.
Sexual harassment cases are often "he said-she said" kinds
of disputes. Evidence reflecting the behavior of both parties
can be critical, including the defendant's relationships with
other employees in the workplace.
Such questions can be uncomfortable, but they occur every day
in courts and law offices across our country.
Individuals in those cases take an oath to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. And no one
is entitled to lie under oath simply because he or she does not
like the questions or because he believes the case is frivolous
or that it is financially motivated or politically motivated.
The Supreme Court has emphatically and repeatedly rejected
the notion that there is ever a privilege to lie. The court has
stated that there are ways to object to questions. Lying under
oath is not one of them.
During this fact-gathering process, Judge Susan Webber Wright
in Little Rock followed standard principles of sexual harassment
cases. Over repeated objections from the president's attorneys,
the judge permitted inquiries into the president's relationships
with government employees.
On January 8, 1998, for example, Judge Wright stated that
questions as to the president's relationships with other
government employees, in the words of the judge, are within the
scope of issues in this case.
In making these rulings, Judge Susan Webber Wright recognized
that the questions might prove embarrassing. She stated, in her
words, "I have never had a sexual harassment case where there
was not some embarrassment." She also stated that she could
not protect the parties from embarrassment.
Let me summarize the five points that explain how the
president's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky -- what was otherwise
private conduct -- became a matter of concern to the courts.
This is critical to fully understand the nature of the
committee's inquiry.
One, the president was sued for sexual harassment in federal
court, and the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in that
case that the case should go forward.
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