Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to appear before the
committee and to provide information relating to the committee's inquiry into
possible impeachable offenses by the president of the United States. This is
my first opportunity to publicly report on certain issues related to our
investigation. I look forward to doing so and assisting the committee.
I. Introduction
I appreciate both the seriousness of the committee's work and the gravity
of its assignment. I have reviewed the statements made by the 37 committee
members in the Oct. 5 hearing. Any citizen who watched that hearing would have
been impressed by the depth and breadth of the discussion that day, and proud
of the diligence with which members of this committee are approaching this
extraordinarily difficult and unwelcome task. I appear before you today,
therefore, fully recognizing the solemnity and importance of this process.
As you know, in January of this year, Attorney General Reno petitioned the
three-judge panel that oversees independent counsels to authorize our office
to investigate whether Monica Lewinsky or others committed federal crimes
relating to the sexual harassment lawsuit brought by Paula Jones against
President Clinton. Our office conducted a swift yet thorough investigation. We
completed the primary factual investigation in under eight months,
notwithstanding a number of obstacles in our path.
The law requires an independent counsel to report to the House of
Representatives substantial and credible information that may constitute
grounds for an impeachment. On Sept. 9, pursuant to our statutory duty, we
submitted a referral and backup documentation to the House. I am here today at
your invitation in furtherance of our statutory obligation.
I recognize that the House of Representatives Ñ not an independent counsel
Ñ has the sole power to impeach. My role here today is to discuss our referral
and our investigation.
II. Lewinsky Investigation
A. Overview
Let me begin with an overview. As our referral explains, the evidence
suggests that the president made false statements under oath and otherwise
thwarted the search for truth in the Jones v. Clinton case. The evidence
further suggests that the president made false statements under oath to the
grand jury on Aug. 17.
That same night, the president publicly acknowledged an inappropriate
relationship, but maintained that his testimony had been legally accurate. The
president also declared that all inquiries into the matter should end because,
he said, it was private.
Shortly after the president's Aug. 17 speech, Sens. Lieberman, Kerrey, and
Moynihan stated that the president's actions were not a private matter. In our
view, they were correct. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the president
repeatedly tried to thwart the legal process in the Jones case and the grand
jury investigation. That is not a private matter. The evidence further
suggests that the president, in the course of these efforts, misused his
authority and power as president and contravened his duty to faithfully
execute the laws. That, too, is not a private matter.
The evidence suggests that the misuse of presidential authority occurred in
the following 10 ways:
First. The evidence suggests that the president made a series of
premeditated false statements under oath in his civil deposition on Jan. 17,
1998. The president had taken an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth. By making false statements under oath, the president,
the chief executive of our nation, failed to adhere to that oath and to his
presidential oath to faithfully execute the laws.
Second. The evidence suggests that, apart from making false statements
under oath, the president engaged in a pattern of behavior during the Jones
litigation to thwart the judicial process. The president reached an agreement
with Ms. Lewinsky that each would make false statements under oath. He
provided job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky at a time when the Jones case was
proceeding and Ms. Lewinsky's truthful testimony would have been harmful. He
engaged in an apparent scheme to conceal gifts that had been subpoenaed from
Ms. Lewinsky. He coached a potential witness, his own secretary Betty Currie,
with a false account of relevant events.
Those acts constitute a pattern of obstruction that is fundamentally
inconsistent with the president's duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Third. The evidence suggests that the president participated in a scheme at
his deposition in which his attorney, in his presence, deceived a United
States district judge in an effort to cut off questioning about Ms. Lewinsky.
The president did not correct his attorney's false statement. A false
statement to a federal judge in order to prevent relevant questioning is an
obstruction of the judicial process.
Fourth. The evidence suggests that on Jan. 23, 1998, after the criminal
investigation had become public, the president made false statements to his
Cabinet and used his Cabinet as unwitting surrogates to publicly support the
president's false story.
Fifth. The evidence suggests that the president, acting in a premeditated
and calculated fashion, deceived the American people on Jan. 26 and on other
occasions when he denied a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
Sixth. The evidence suggests that the president, after the criminal
investigation became public, made false statements to his aides and concocted
false alibis that these government employees repeated to the grand jury. As a
result, the grand jury received inaccurate information.
Seventh. Having promised the American people to cooperate with the
investigation, the president refused six invitations to testify to the grand
jury. Refusing to cooperate with a duly authorized federal criminal
investigation is inconsistent with the general statutory duty imposed on all
executive branch employees to cooperate with criminal investigations. It also
is inconsistent with the president's duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Eighth. The president and his administration asserted three different
governmental privileges to conceal relevant information from the federal grand
jury. The privilege assertions were legally baseless in these circumstances.
They were inconsistent with the actions of Presidents Carter and Reagan in
similar circumstances. And they delayed and impeded the investigation.
Ninth. The president made false statements under oath to the grand jury on
Aug. 17, 1998. The president again took an oath to tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence demonstrates that the president
failed to adhere to that oath and thus to his presidential oath to faithfully
execute the laws.
Tenth. The evidence suggests that the president deceived the American
people in his speech on Aug. 17 by stating that his testimony had been legally
accurate.
In addition to those 10 points, it bears mention that well before January
1998, the president used government resources and prerogatives to pursue his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The evidence suggests that the president
used his secretary Betty Currie, a government employee, to facilitate and
conceal the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The president used White House
aides and the United States ambassador to the United Nations in his effort to
find Ms. Lewinsky a job at a time when it was foreseeable Ñ even likely Ñ that
she would be a witness in the Jones case. And the president used a government
attorney Ñ Bruce Lindsey Ñ to assist his personal legal defense during the
Jones case.
In short, the evidence suggests that the president repeatedly used the
machinery of government and the powers of his office to conceal his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the American people, from the judicial
process in the Jones case, and from the grand jury.
B. Sexual Harassment Law
Let me turn, then, to the legal context in which the Lewinsky issues first
arose. At the outset, I want to emphasize that our referral never suggests
that the relationship between the president and Ms. Lewinsky in and of itself
could be a high crime or misdemeanor. Indeed, the referral never passes
judgment on the president's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The propriety of a
relationship is not the concern of our office.
The referral is instead about obstruction of justice, lying under oath,
tampering with witnesses, and misuse of power. The referral cannot be
understood without appreciating this vital distinction.
This case raises the following initial question: Is a plaintiff in a sexual
harassment lawsuit entitled to obtain truthful evidence from the defendant,
and from associates of the defendant, in order to support her claim? That
should be easy to answer. No citizen who finds himself accused in a sexual
harassment case, or in any other kind of case, can lie under oath or otherwise
obstruct justice and thereby prevent the plaintiff from discovering evidence
and proving her case.
Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a federal sexual
harassment suit against President Clinton in 1994. The president denied those
allegations. We will never know whether a jury would have credited Ms. Jones'
allegations. We also will never know whether the ultimate decision-maker would
have found that the alleged facts, if true, constitute sexual harassment. When
the president and Ms. Jones settled the case last week, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals was still considering the preliminary legal question whether
the facts as alleged could constitute sexual harassment.
After the suit was first filed in 1994, the president attempted to delay
the trial until his presidency was over. The president claimed a temporary
presidential immunity from civil suit. The case proceeded to the Supreme
Court. At oral argument, the president's attorney specifically warned our
nation's highest court that if Ms. Jones won, her lawyers would be able to
investigate the president's relationships with other women, as is common in
sexual harassment cases. The Supreme Court rejected the president's
constitutional claim Ñ and did so by a nine to zero vote. The court concluded
that the Constitution did not provide such a temporary immunity from suit.
The idea was simple and powerful: No one is above the law. The Supreme
Court sent the case back for trial with words that warrant emphasis: "Like
every other citizen who invokes" the District Court's jurisdiction, Ms. Jones
"has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims."
After the Supreme Court's decision, the parties started to gather the
facts. The parties questioned relevant witnesses in depositions. They
submitted written questions. They made requests for documents.
Sexual harassment cases are often "he said-she said" disputes. Evidence
reflecting the behavior of both parties can be critical Ñ including the
defendant's relationships with other employees in the workplace.
Such questions can be uncomfortable, but they occur every day in courts and
law offices around the country. Individuals take an oath to tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. And no one is entitled to lie
under oath simply because he or she does not like the questions or because he
believes the case is frivolous or financially motivated or politically
motivated. The Supreme Court has emphatically and repeatedly rejected the
notion that there is ever a privilege to lie. The court has stated that there
are ways to object to questions; lying under oath is not one of them.
During the fact-gathering process, Judge Susan Webber Wright followed the
standard principles of sexual harassment cases.
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