Over repeated objection from the president's attorneys, the judge permitted
inquiries into the president's relationships with government employees. On
Jan. 8, 1998, for example, Judge Wright stated that questions as to the
president's relationships with other employees "are within the scope of the
issues in this case."
In making these rulings, Judge Wright recognized that the questions might
prove embarrassing. She stated that "I have never had a sexual harassment case
where there was not some embarrassment." She also stated that she could not
protect the parties from embarrassment.
Let me summarize the five points that explain how the president's
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky Ñ what was otherwise private conduct Ñ became a
matter of concern to the courts. This is critical to fully understand the
nature of the committee's inquiry.
One. The president was sued for sexual harassment, and the Supreme Court
ruled that the case should go forward.
Two. The law of sexual harassment and the law of evidence allow the
plaintiff to inquire into the defendant's relationships with other women in
the workplace, which in this case included President Clinton's relationship
with Ms. Lewinsky.
Three. Applying those settled legal principles, Judge Susan Webber Wright
repeatedly rejected the president's objections to such inquiries. The judge,
instead, ordered the president to answer the questions.
Four. It is a federal crime to commit perjury and obstruct justice in civil
cases, including sexual harassment cases. Violators are subject to a sentence
of up to 10 years imprisonment for obstruction and up to five years for perjury.
Five. The evidence suggests that the president and Ms. Lewinsky made false
statements under oath and obstructed the judicial process in the Jones case by
preventing the court from obtaining the truth about their relationship.
At his grand jury appearance, the president invoked a Supreme Court
justice's confirmation hearings as a comparison to his current situation. The
president's use of the analogy did not fit the facts in the Monica Lewinsky
matter, however. The president's having raised the analogy, let me make it
more fitting to the case here.
Suppose that there is a nominee for a high government position. Assume that
there is an allegation of sexual harassment. Suppose that several women other
than the accuser who have worked with the nominee testify before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Suppose that the nominee confers with one of those women
ahead of time, and that they agree that they will both lie to the Judiciary
Committee about their relationship. Assume further that they both do lie under
oath about their relationship. And suppose further that a criminal
investigation develops and the nominee again lies under oath to the grand
jury. If that were proved to have happened, what would the Senate Judiciary
Committee do?
Suppose that the lying under oath and obstruction of justice occurs in a
sexual harassment suit brought against the nominee. Suppose further that the
false statements and obstruction continue into a subsequent criminal
investigation. What would this committee do with compelling evidence of
perjury and obstruction of justice committed by, for example, a justice of the
Supreme Court in a sexual harassment suit in which he was the defendant?
Those hypotheticals Ñ which track the facts of this case Ñ put in relief
the issue before the Committee. Let me again stress that the House, not an
independent counsel, has the sole power to impeach. I am suggesting that
consideration of our referral be focused on the issues actually presented by
the referral.
C. The President's Actions: Dec. 5-Jan. 17
I will next turn to some of the essentials of the referral. That will
include the specifics of Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case and the
president's actions in response to that involvement.
The key point about the president's conduct is this. On at least six
different occasions Ñ from Dec. 17, 1997, through Aug. 17, 1998 Ñ the
president had to make a decision. He could choose truth, or he could choose
deception. On all six occasions, the president chose deception Ñ a pattern of
calculated behavior over a span of months.
On Dec. 5, 1997, Ms. Jones's attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky as a
potential witness. Within a day, the president learned that Ms. Lewinsky's
name was on the witness list.
After learning this, the president faced his first critical decision. Would
he and Monica Lewinsky tell the truth about their relationship? Or would they
provide false information Ñ not just to a spouse or to loved ones Ñ but under
oath in a court of law?
Eleven months ago, the president made his decision. At approximately 2 a.m.
on Dec. 17, 1997, he called Ms. Lewinsky at her Watergate apartment and told
her that she was on the witness list. This was news to Ms. Lewinsky. And it
bears noting that the president Ñ not his lawyer Ñ made this call to the witness.
During this 2 a.m. conversation, which lasted approximately half an hour,
the president could have told Ms. Lewinsky that they must tell the truth under
oath. The president could have explained that they might face embarrassment
but that, as a citizen and as president, he could not lie under oath and he
could not sit by while Monica did so. The president did not say anything like
that.
On the contrary, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the president suggested that
she could sign an affidavit and use Ñ under oath Ñ deceptive cover stories
that they had devised long ago to explain why Ms. Lewinsky had visited the
Oval Office area. The president did not explicitly instruct Ms. Lewinsky to
lie. He did not have to. Ms. Lewinsky testified that the president's
suggestion that they use the pre-existing cover stories amounted to a
continuation of their pattern of concealing their intimate relationship.
Starting with this conversation, the president and Ms. Lewinsky understood,
according to Ms. Lewinsky, that they were both going to make false statements
under oath.
The conversation between the president and Ms. Lewinsky on Dec. 17 was a
critical turning point. The evidence suggests that the president chose to
engage in a criminal act Ñ to reach an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky that
they would both make false statements under oath. At that moment, the
president's intimate relationship with a subordinate employee was transformed
into an unlawful effort to thwart the judicial process. This was no longer an
issue of private conduct.
Recall that the Supreme Court had concluded that Paula Jones was entitled
to an "orderly disposition" of her claims. The president's action on Dec. 17
was his first direct effort to thwart the Supreme Court's mandate.
The story continued: The president faced a second choice. On Dec. 23, 1997,
the president submitted under oath a written answer to an interrogatory. The
request stated in relevant part: "Please state the name ... of (federal
employees) with whom you had sexual relations when you (were) ... president of
the United States." In his sworn answer, the president stated "None."
On Dec. 28, the president faced a third critical choice. On that day, the
president met with Ms. Lewinsky at the White House. They discussed the fact
that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed for gifts she had received from the
president. According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the question of what she
should do with the gifts. Later that day, the president's personal secretary,
Betty Currie, drove to Ms. Lewinsky's Watergate home. Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms.
Currie a sealed box that contained some of the subpoenaed gifts. Ms. Currie
then stored the box under her bed at home.
In her written proffer on Feb. 1, four weeks after the fact, Ms. Lewinsky
stated that Ms. Currie had called her to retrieve the gifts. If so, that
necessarily meant that the president had asked Ms. Currie to call. It would
directly and undeniably implicate him in an obstruction of justice. Ms.
Lewinsky later repeated that statement in testimony under oath. Ms. Currie,
for her part, recalls Ms. Lewinsky calling her. But even if Ms. Lewinsky
called Ms. Currie, common sense and the evidence suggest some presidential
knowledge or involvement, as the referral explains.
Let me add another point about the gifts. In his grand jury appearance in
August, the president testified that he had no particular concern about the
gifts in December 1997 when he had talked to Ms. Lewinsky about them. And he
thus suggested that he would have had no reason to take part in December in a
plan to conceal the gifts. But there is a serious problem with the president's
explanation. If it were true that the president in December was unconcerned
about the gifts, he presumably would have told the truth under oath in his
January deposition about the large number of gifts that he and Ms. Lewinsky
had exchanged. But he did not tell the truth. At that deposition, when asked
whether he had ever given gifts to Monica Lewinsky, and he had given her
several on Dec. 28, the president stated "I don't recall. Do you know what
they were?"
In short, the critical facts to emphasize about the transfer of gifts are
these: First, the president and Ms. Lewinsky met and discussed what should be
done with the gifts subpoenaed from Ms. Lewinsky. Second, the president's
personal secretary Ms. Currie drove later that day to Ms. Lewinsky's home to
pick up the gifts. Third, Ms. Currie stored the box under her bed.
Meanwhile, the legal process continued to unfold, and the president took
other actions that had the foreseeable effect of keeping Ms. Lewinsky "on the
team." The president helped Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York. His efforts
began after the Supreme Court's decision in May 1997 Ñ at a time when it had
become foreseeable that she could be an adverse witness against the president.
These job-related efforts intensified in December 1997 after Ms. Lewinsky's
name appeared on the witness list.
Vernon Jordan, who had been enlisted in the job search for Ms. Lewinsky,
testified that he kept the president informed of the status of Ms. Lewinsky's
job search and her affidavit. On Jan. 7, 1998, Mr. Jordan told the president
that Ms. Lewinsky had signed the affidavit. Mr. Jordan stated to the president
that he was still working on getting her a job. The president replied, "Good."
In other words, the president, knowing that a witness had just signed a false
affidavit, encouraged his friend to continue trying to find her a job. After
Ms. Lewinsky received a job offer from Revlon on Jan. 12, Vernon Jordan called
the president and said: "Mission accomplished.
As is often the situation in cases involving this kind of financial
assistance, no direct evidence reveals the president's intent in assisting Ms.
Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky testified that no one promised her a job for silence;
of course, crimes ordinarily do not take place with such explicit discussion.
But federal courts instruct juries that circumstantial evidence is just as
probative as direct evidence. And the circumstantial evidence here is strong.
At a bare minimum, the evidence suggests that the president's job assistance
efforts stemmed from his desire to placate Ms. Lewinsky so that she would not
be tempted Ñ under the burden of an oath Ñ to tell the truth about the
relationship. Monica Lewinsky herself recognized that at the time, saying to a
friend, "Somebody could construe or say, 'Well, they gave her a job to shut
her up. They made her happy."'
And given that the president's plan to testify falsely could succeed only
if Ms. Lewinsky went along, the president naturally had to be concerned that
Ms. Lewinsky at any time might turn around and decide to tell the truth.
Indeed, some wanted her to tell the truth. For example, one friend talked to
Ms. Lewinsky about the Dec. 28 meeting with the president. The friend stated
that she was concerned because she "didn't want to see (Monica) being like
Susan McDougal" and did not want Monica to lie to protect the president.
Needless to say, any sudden decision by Ms. Lewinsky to tell the truth,
whether out of anger at the president or simple desire to be law-abiding,
would have been very harmful to the president. That helps to explain his
motive in providing job assistance.
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