In mid-January, Ms. Lewinsky finalized her false affidavit with her
attorney, who sent it to Judge Wright's Court. The affidavit falsely denied
a sexual relationship with the president and essentially recounted the cover
stories they had discussed in their middle-of-the-night conversation on Dec.
17.
Let me turn to the president's Jan. 17 deposition. Some have suggested
that the president might have been surprised or ambushed at his deposition.
Those suggestions are wrong. The president had clear warning that there
would be questions about Monica Lewinsky. She had been named on the Dec. 5
witness list. On Jan. 12, only five days before the deposition, Ms. Jones'
attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky as a trial witness. In response, Judge
Wright approved her as a witness. Two days later, on Jan. 14, the
president's private attorney asked Ms. Lewinsky's attorney to fax Ms.
Lewinsky's affidavit. During the deposition itself, the president's attorney
stated that the president was "fully familiar" with Ms. Lewinsky's
affidavit.
At the outset of his Jan. 17 deposition, therefore, the president faced a
fourth critical decision. Fully aware that he would likely receive questions
about Ms. Lewinsky, would the president continue to make false statements
under oath Ñ this time in the presence of a United States District judge?
At the start of the deposition, Judge Susan Webber Wright administered
the oath. The president swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth. As his testimony began, the president, in response to
a question from Ms. Jones' attorneys, stated that he understood he was
providing his testimony under the penalty of perjury.
The president was asked a series of questions about Ms. Lewinsky. After a
few questions, the president's attorney Ñ Mr. Bennett Ñ objected to the
questioning about Ms. Lewinsky, referring to it as "innuendo." Mr. Bennett
produced Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit. Mr. Bennett stated to Judge Wright
that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit indicated that "there is absolutely no sex of
any kind in any manner, shape, or form." Mr. Bennett stated that the
president was "fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit." During Mr.
Bennett's statements, the president sat back and let his attorney mislead
Judge Wright. The president said not a word Ñ to the judge or, so far as we
are aware, to his attorney.
Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection. The questioning
continued. In response, the president made false statements not only about
his intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, but about a whole host of
matters. The president testified that he did not know that Vernon Jordan had
met with Ms. Lewinsky and talked about the Jones case. That was untrue. He
testified that he could not recall being alone with Ms Lewinsky. That was
untrue. He testified that he could not recall ever being in the Oval Office
hallway with Ms. Lewinsky except perhaps when she was delivering pizza. That
was untrue. He testified that he could not recall gifts exchanged between
Ms. Lewinsky and him. That was untrue. He testified Ñ after a 14-second
pause Ñ that he was "not sure" whether he had ever talked to Ms. Lewinsky
about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in the lawsuit.
That was untrue. The president testified that he did not know whether Ms.
Lewinsky had been served a subpoena at the time he last saw her in December
1997. That was untrue. When his attorney read Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit
denying a sexual relationship, the president stated that the affidavit was
"absolutely true." That was untrue.
The evidence thus suggests that the president Ñ long aware that Ms.
Lewinsky was a likely topic of questioning at his deposition Ñ made not one,
or two, but a series of false statements under oath. The president further
allowed his attorney to use Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, which the president
knew to be false, to deceive the court. This evidence suggests that the
president directly contravened the oath he had taken Ñ as well as the
Supreme Court's mandate, in which the court had stated that Ms. Jones was
entitled, like every other citizen, to a lawful disposition of her case.
D. The President's Actions: Jan. 17-21
As our referral outlines, the president's deposition did not mark the end
of the scheme to conceal. During his deposition testimony, the president
referred to his secretary Betty Currie. The president testified, for
example, that Ms. Lewinsky had come to the White House to see Ms. Currie,
not him; that Ms. Currie had been involved in assisting Ms. Lewinsky in her
job search; and that Ms. Currie had communicated with Vernon Jordan about
Mr. Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. In response to one question at the
deposition, the president said he did not know the answer and "you'd have to
ask Betty."
Given the president's repeated references to Ms. Currie and his
suggestion to Ms. Jones' attorneys that they contact her, the president had
to know that Ms. Jones' attorneys might want to question Ms. Currie. Shortly
after 7 p.m. on Saturday, Jan. 17 Ñ just two and a half hours after the
deposition Ñ the president attempted to contact Ms. Currie at her home. The
president asked Ms. Currie to come to the White House the next day, which
she did, although it was unusual for her to come in on a Sunday. According
to Ms. Currie, the president appeared concerned and made a number of
statements abut Ms. Lewinsky to Ms. Currie. The statements included:
"You were always there when she was there, right? We were never really
alone."
"You could see and hear everything."
Ms. Currie concluded that the president wanted her to agree with him when
he made these statements. Ms. Currie stated that she did in fact indicate
her agreement Ñ although she knew that the president and Ms. Lewinsky had
been alone and that she could not hear or see them when they were alone.
Ms. Currie further testified that the president ran through the same basic
statements with her again on January 20 or 21.
What is important with respect to these two episodes is that at the time
the president made these statements, he knew that they were false. He knew he
had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He knew Ms. Currie could not see or hear
everything. The president thus could not have been trying to refresh his
recollection, as he subsequently suggested. That raises the question: Is there
a legitimate explanation for the president to have said those things in that
manner to Ms. Currie? The circumstances suggest not. The facts suggest that
the president was attempting to improperly coach Ms. Currie, at a time when he
could foresee that she was not a potential witness in Jones v. Clinton.
E. The President's Actions: Jan. 21-Aug. 17
The president's next major decision came in the days immediately after Jan.
21. On the 21st, The Washington Post publicly reported the story of Ms.
Lewinsky's relationship with the president. After the public disclosure of his
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and the ongoing criminal investigation, the
president faced a decision. Would he admit the relationship publicly, correct
his testimony in Ms. Jones' case, and ask for the indulgence of the American
people? Or would he continue to deny the truth?
For this question, the president consulted others. According to Dick
Morris, the president and he talked on Jan. 21. Mr. Morris suggested that the
president publicly confess. The president replied "But what about the legal
thing? You know, the legal thing? You know. Starr and perjury and all." Mr.
Morris suggested they take a poll. The president agreed. Mr. Morris called
with the results. He stated that the American people were willing to forgive
adultery but not perjury or obstruction of justice. The president replied,
"Well, we just have to win, then."
Over the next several months, it became apparent that the strategy to win
had many prongs. First, the president denied the truth publicly and
emphatically. Second, he publicly promised to cooperate with the
investigation. Third, the president deflected and diverted the investigation
by telling aides false stories that were then relayed to the grand jury.
Fourth, he refused invitations to testify to the grand jury for over six
months. Fifth, his administration delayed the investigation through multiple
privilege claims, each of which has been rejected by the federal courts.
Sixth, surrogates of the president attacked the credibility and legitimacy of
the grand jury investigation. Seventh, surrogates of the president attempted
to convince the Congress and the American people that the matter was unimportant.
The first step was for the president to deny the truth publicly. For this,
political polling led to Hollywood staging. The president's California friend
and producer Harry Thomason flew to Washington and advised that the president
needed to be very forceful in denying the relationship. On Monday, Jan. 26, in
the Roosevelt Room, before members of Congress and other citizens, the
president provided a clear and emphatic public statement denying the relationship.
The president also made false statements to his Cabinet and aides. They
then spoke publicly and professed their belief in the president.
The second step was to promise cooperation. The president told the American
people on several television and radio shows on Jan. 21 and 22 that "I'm going
to do my best to cooperate with the investigation."
The third step was the president's refusal to provide testimony to the
grand jury despite six invitations to do so and despite his public promise to
cooperate. Refusing invitations to provide information to a grand jury in a
federal criminal investigation authorized by the attorney general of the
United States Ñ and one in which there is a high national interest in prompt
completion Ñ was inconsistent with the president's initial January promise to
cooperate and with the general statutory duty of all government officials to
cooperate with federal criminal investigations.
As a fourth step, the president not only refused to testify himself, but he
authorized the use of various governmental privileges to delay the testimony
of many of his taxpayer-paid assistants. The extensive use of governmental
privileges against grand jury and criminal investigations has, of course, been
a pattern throughout the administration. Most notably, the White House cited
privilege in 1993 to prevent Justice Department and Park Police officials from
reviewing documents in Vincent Foster's office in the days after his death.
In the Lewinsky investigation, the president asserted two privileges,
executive privilege and a government attorney-client privilege. A subordinate
administration official, without objection from the president, claimed a
previously unheard-of privilege that was called the protective function
privilege. The privileges were asserted to prevent the full testimony of
several White House aides and the full testimony of the sworn law enforcement
officers of the Secret Service.
In asserting executive privilege, the president was plowing headlong into
the Supreme Court's unanimous decision 24 years ago in United States v. Nixon.
There, the Supreme Court ruled that executive privilege was overcome by the
need for relevant evidence in criminal proceedings. And thus, it came as no
surprise that Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson rejected President Clinton's
effort to use executive privilege to prevent disclosure of relevant evidence.
Page 4
