The heady days of that first Israeli-Palestinian handshake on the White House lawn are ancient history, and seven years later the peace process that has consumed much of President Clinton's foreign policy focus now looks unlikely to be concluded on his watch. Last year's election of Ehud Barak over Benjamin Netanyahu, who had always opposed the peace process and whose tenure saw it grind to a halt, revived optimism over the prospects for peace agreements between Israel and Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. But a year later, the Syrian track is all but dead (and with it chances of a formal deal with Lebanon, despite Israel's withdrawal of troops) and Barak looks hardly more likely than Netanyahu to conclude a final deal with the Palestinians.

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But the Oslo process had enemies on both sides: Israeli right-wingers led by Netanyahu opposed the very principle of trading land for peace and vowed to resist the surrender of any territory over which the Israeli flag flew; Islamic fundamentalist Palestinians rallied around the Hamas movement to denounce a peace agreement that would involve Palestinian and Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist on what was once Palestinian land. And on both sides, naysayers were prepared to resort to violence. In February 1994, an Israeli settler, Baruch Goldstein, massacred 29 Palestinians inside a religious site at Hebron, and then in November 1995 a young religious conservative, Yigal Amir, assassinated Rabin. Then in February and March of 1996, Hamas launched its deadliest assault yet on the peace process, killing 57 Israelis in a series of suicide bombings that prompted acting prime minister Shimon Peres to break off peace talks.

Two months later, Benjamin Netanyahu narrowly defeated Peres and jammed the brakes on the peace process. Soon after taking office he lifted a four-year freeze on building new settlements in the West Bank, and then authorized the opening of a tunnel at an Islamic holy site in Jerusalem that provoked an outbreak of violence in which 61 Palestinians and 15 Israelis died. Netanyahu complied with Israel's commitment to turn over 80 percent of the town of Hebron to Palestinian control in January 1997, but that was the last land transfer until the October 1998 Wye River accord, where the U.S. pushed Israel into handing over a few extra parcels. Far from having built up the mutual trust and confidence to resolve the difficult obstacles to long-term peace, Oslo's five-year deadline passed without "final status" talks even getting under way.

Barak's reluctance to turn over land to the Palestinians and release Palestinian prisoners ahead of a final agreement quickly soured the optimism sparked by his election. And Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, perceived throughout the Arab world as a dramatic victory for Hezbollah after a 20-year guerrilla war, added to the pressure on Arafat. After all, Palestinian militants now argue, if Israel can withdraw from 100 percent of Egyptian and Lebanese territory, then why shouldn't the Palestinians hold out for the same? At the same time, Barak is in trouble at home, with defections from his coalition raising questions over whether he can deliver Israeli endorsement of an agreement. As the hour of truth approaches, both leaders find their room for compromise narrowed — it's difficult to see how Arafat will be able to accept the limits on Palestinian statehood implied in the best offer Barak is likely to make. Which may be why the White House is doing its best to diminish expectations of the Camp David summit.