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SCOTT BARBOUR/GETTY IMAGES
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ON A MISSION:
BBlair won the support of Parliament for the war in Iraq |
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Posted Sunday, August 31, 2003; 15:15BST
The British government's dossier, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," was meant to sharpen public appetite for war with Saddam. Instead it has become a political game with deadly consequences and Tony Blair's toughest test of credibility in office. The plot is worthy of Le Carré, the detail can be dizzying and the stakes are enormously high. Here, in the words of the main characters, is a chronology of events so far
Late Aug. 2002 In a telephone conversation, George W. Bush and Tony Blair agree to highlight Saddam's threat by publishing a dossier of intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Aug. 30 An MI6 report, citing a senior Iraqi officer as its source, warns that chemical and biological munitions "could be with military units and ready for firing within 45 minutes."
Sept. 5 An e-mail sent to Jonathan Powell, Blair's chief of staff, by Downing Street communications director Alastair Campbell says, "Re dossier, substantial rewrite ... Structure as per TB's [Tony Blair's] discussion. Agreement that there has to be real intelligence material in their presentation as such."
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Sept. 9 The Joint Intelligence Committee, headed by the low-profile figure of John Scarlett, delivers its final classified assessment with a revision stating:
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Intelligence also indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 20 to 45 minutes.. |
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Sept. 10-11 A new draft of the dossier is delivered to Downing Street. A member of Scarlett's staff sends an urgent "last call" for evidence to intelligence heads, saying No. 10 wants "the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence."
Sept. 17 In an e-mail to Scarlett, Powell complains: "the document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam." Campbell sends a memo to Scarlett requesting changes and questioning the use of the wording "may be able" in regard to the 45-minute claim.
sept. 18 Scarlett e-mails back to Campbell: "The language you quoted ... has been tightened."
Sept. 24 The dossier is published. Introducing it in the House of Commons, Tony Blair says: "His weapons of mass destruction program is active, detailed and growing." The crucial text now reads: "The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so."
Feb. 27, 2003 David Broucher, a British representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, meets with government weapons expert David Kelly. Kelly is concerned that an invasion would compromise him with Iraqis he had persuaded to co-operate with weapons inspectors, saying: "I will probably be found dead in the woods."
March 20 U.S. and British forces launch military operations to topple Saddam's regime.
April 14 The Pentagon announces an end to major combat engagements in Iraq.
May 22 Kelly meets BBC correspondent Andrew Gilligan in a central London hotel. What Kelly told Gilligan — and whether he was in a position to know it — would be a subject of hot dispute.
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May 29 Speaking on BBC Radio 4's Today program, Gilligan quotes a source who told him:
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It [the dossier] was transformed in the week before it was published to make it sexier. The classic example was the claim that weapons of mass destruction were ready for use within 45 minutes. That information was not in the original draft. It was included in the dossier against our wishes, because it wasn't reliable … [it] was transformed at the behest of Downing Street." |
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June 1 Gilligan repeats his allegations in a column in the Mail on Sunday newspaper, quoting the unnamed Kelly on how the 45- minute claim came to be attached to Iraqi WMD. "The answer was a single word. 'Campbell.' What? Campbell made it up? 'No, it was real information. But it was included against our wishes because it wasn't reliable.'"
June 3 Labour's John Reid, Leader of the House, claims "rogue elements" in the security services are responsible for spreading falsehoods.
June 6 Campbell attacks a "series of inaccuracies" in Gilligan's reports.
June 19 Gilligan defends his source before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) as "closely connected" and "sufficiently senior and credible to be worth reporting."
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June 25 In his evidence to the FAC, Alastair Campbell says:
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I know we are right in relation to that 45-minute point. It is completely and totally untrue. It is — I don't use this word lightly — it is actually a lie ... |
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June 26 Campbell demands an apology from the BBC, whose news director Richard Sambrook responds: "We stand by our entire story … this is an unprecedented level of pressure on the BBC from Downing Street.
June 27 Kevin Marsh, Gilligan's editor at Today, writes an e-mail to his boss: "Our biggest millstone has been his loose use of language and lack of judgment in some of his phraseology."
June 30 Kelly writes to his manager at the Ministry of Defence admitting he had met Gilligan on May 22 but denies saying Campbell had "sexed up" the dossier.
July 6 BBC governors issue a statement defending Gilligan's report and calling on Campbell to withdraw allegations of bias.
July 7 The FAC publishes its report, clearing ministers of misleading Parliament but further challenging the government over its intelligence assessments.
July 8 The Ministry of Defence reveals a government official has admitted speaking to Gilligan, identifying him as "an expert on WMD whose contribution to the dossier of September 2002 was to contribute toward drafts of historical accounts of U.N. inspections," but asserts that he had made no comment on either the 45-minute claim or Campbell.
July 9 Defence Minister Geoff Hoon writes to Gavyn Davies, chairman of the BBC's board of governors, asking him to confirm Kelly is the source. The BBC refuses; the MoD confirms Kelly's identity to journalists.
July 15 Kelly gives evidence to the FAC, admits meeting Gilligan but denying that the journalist's claims were "a factual record of my interaction with him." The FAC decides he was "most unlikely" to be the source of the "sexed-up" claims.
July 16 Tony Blair challenges the BBC to name its source. "The Ministry of Defence made it clear that of course they don't know who the source is. There's only one body that does — the BBC. All they have to do is say yes or no — why don't they?"
July 17 Gilligan faces the FAC for a second time, in private session, and is branded by some committee members as an "unsatisfactory witness." Kelly leaves home, telling his wife he is going for a walk near his home in Abingdon, Oxfordshire.
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July 18 Police find Kelly's body after his apparent suicide by cutting his wrist after taking powerful painkillers. His family says:
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Events over recent weeks made David's life intolerable and all those involved should reflect long and hard on this fact. |
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July 20 The BBC issues a statement naming Kelly as the source of Gilligan's report.
July 21 An inquiry is announced, under Lord Hutton, into the circumstances surrounding Kelly's death.
Aug. 19 Campbell tells the inquiry that he had nothing to do with inserting the 45-minute claim into the September dossier; Scarlett and others later back him up.
Aug. 28 Blair tells the Hutton inquiry: "Had the allegation been true, it would have merited my resignation. It was not a small allegation, it was absolutely fundamental."
Aug. 29 Campbell resigns.
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