TIME EUROPE
August 28, 2000, Vol. 156 No. 9
Death Watch
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It remained unclear what caused the loss of the Kursk. Russian officials fell back on old Soviet habits of secrecy and confusion during the first days of the disaster. They made no announcement for two days before issuing a bland statement that there had been a "technical fault" and the boat was on the sea bottom. After the seriousness of the accident became clearer, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev declared that there was "incontrovertible evidence" the sub had collided with another vessel. In past years Soviet and American vessels have had near-collisions while spying on each other, but the Pentagon firmly rejected any suggestion that the U.S. submarines were involved. Later, Russian officials dropped the collision claim and blamed an explosion in the weapons area, a theory supported by Western experts who said it could have come from a torpedo or missile or a high-pressure air tank used to blow ballast water when surfacing. According to Jane's Fighting Ships, the Kursk would normally carry 24 cruise missiles able to deliver either 750 kg of high explosive or a nuclear warhead a distance of 500 km, plus as many as 28 torpedoes with similar warhead capability (although the Russians said the Kursk was carrying no nuclear weapons under the terms of an agreement with the U.S. that neither side will deploy tactical nuclear weapons).
By week's end, Klebanov had gone back to the collision theory, saying the sub hit a "huge, heavy object," something of "very large tonnage" that tore open the boat's double hull — but he offered no suggestions about what the object might have been, and there were no reports of a surface ship in the area with what would have been severe hull damage.
Whatever the direct cause of the disaster, the Kursk was doomed as much by underfunding, insufficient training and incompetent military management as by collision or high explosives. Since the end of the cold war the Russian navy has declined from 613 ships of all types to around 95 today, a drop of 84%, compared to around 40% for Western navies. Of those few ships remaining in the Russian inventory only about 10% are fit to put to sea. One reason is that the bulk of Russia's dwindling defense budget goes to the army and air force to fight the war in Chechnya. That means little money for maintenance, and the result can be seen in naval bases all around Russia where ships lie in rusting rows, crewed by unmotivated and often unpaid sailors whose skills are also rusting away. "Because of poor maintenance levels across much of the fleet, the fleet can't put to sea very often, so personnel are less well trained," says Joanna Kidd, naval analyst at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Kursk, as one of the newest and most important boats in the fleet, would have received enough to keep up maintenance, but probably not enough to keep up vital seatime training. "It's speculation, but their reactions might have been slow" as the accident developed, says Kidd. Similarly, the rescue efforts may have suffered from lack of training. "If most of the Russian navy can hardly put to sea, then it's doubtful whether they have practiced this type of [rescue] operation very often."
The exercise in which the Kursk was lost was part of President Vladimir Putin's declared intention to rebuild the navy at least to the levels of the French and British fleets, if not to the size and might of the U.S. Navy. It was intended to be a dress rehearsal for a show-of-force cruise of the Eastern Mediterranean later this year to be led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the battle cruiser Peter the Great. Losing the Kursk is a major setback for these plans, and for Putin's naval ambitions. "He has aligned himself personally with the revival of the navy's fortunes," says Kidd. "This is a big humiliation for him."
Perhaps that's why Putin had so little to say as the magnitude of the disaster unfolded. He left for his summer vacation retreat in Sochi on the day of the accident and sent no messages of concern or condolence to the fleet or families of the missing men. His officially published schedule told of telephone calls with foreign leaders but made no mention of briefings, consultations or expressions of concern about the Kursk. On Wednesday, dressed casually and looking tanned, he met a group of visiting academics with whom he discussed at relaxed length problems of science, research and the brain drain. After the meeting, in response to journalists' questions, he reluctantly acknowledged that the situation with the Kursk was "critical" and said that "all necessary and possible efforts to save the crew have been carried out."
Not quite. For crucial days, Russian officials had rejected Western offers of help, including the dispatch of U.S., French, British and Norwegian rescue equipment. But, perhaps stung by the questions, Putin on Wednesday ordered the navy to accept Western offers. The Russians promptly invited Norway and Britain to send equipment, but by then it was already a near-certainty that the survivors would perish before the rescuers could reach them. Indeed, shortly before the British team arrived on Saturday the Northern Fleet commander said that "The critical line of survivability has been crossed."
The Russian handling of the accident was a mixture of "pride, arrogance, secrecy and sloppiness," says Paul Beaver, former naval editor of Jane's Defence Weekly in London. "When an accident happens the Russians don't seem to be able to cope with it. They don't have flexible thinking." The prime example of that attitude was the explosion of a reactor at Chernobyl in 1986. Then, too, officials attempted to cover up the seriousness of the accident, refused Western assistance and bungled the subsequent cleanup. That does not bode well for salvaging the wreck of the Kursk, with its weapons and reactors.
Officials have talked of attaching floats to the hulk, inflating them and lifting it to the surface. But with much of the hull flooded, the 14,000-ton Kursk could now be a waterlogged 30,000 tons, even more difficult to handle in the cold and turbulence of the Barents Sea. A chilling but possible alternative would be for the Russians to leave it on the seabed, along with the six other nuclear submarines, four of them Russian, that have sunk in the age of the atom. The double steel hull of the Kursk will provide some containment for the reactors, which are themselves encased in heavy steel pressure vessels. And the cold black submarine would provide a grim but poignant memorial for the 118 sailors who served, and died, in her.
With reporting by Helen Gibson/London, Paul Quinn-Judge/Moscow, Mark Thompson and Douglas Waller/Washington and Yuri Zarakhovich/Murmansk
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August 28, 2000
COVER STORY
Death Watch
A collision or explosion sank the Kursk, but the real cause of the tragedy was the rapid deterioration of Russia's rusting and underfunded armed forces
Failed Ambitions
Putin's dream falls short of reality
Why Did Our Boys Have to Die
At the Kursk's home port, and across Russia, grieving families ask some awkward questions
Death in the Silent Service
Some major accidents aboard nuclear-powered submarines
Divided They Fall
The U.S. and Russia must learn to communicate
MIDDLE EAST
Reform Overruled
Iran's Supreme Leader quashes efforts to lift press constraints, angering those working for progress
AFRICA
Law in Search of Order
Northern Nigeria's Christian community is nervous as a strict Islamic judicial system is reintroduced
The Legacy That Won't Die
Racism remains a thorny issue in South Africa, and bitter exchanges between politicians are adding to the problem
BUSINESS
Architect of Reform
Hans Eichel's success in rewriting the tax code will have far-reaching impact on the German economy
Super Hans Speaks
TIME talks with German Finance Minister Hans Eichel
Theme Park Debacle
World-class exhibitions are failing this year on a world-class scale. What do the folks at VW know?
SOCIETY
Face Lift in a Jar?
More effective than makeup but not as powerful as drugs, cosmeceuticals promise to turn back the clock on aging skin
More Bark Than Bite
Moscow's Night Wolves say they have turned from biker rebels into civic-minded employers
ARTS
The Great Divide
Shocked by the radical changes in her homeland after the 1979 revolution, Iranian-born Shirin Neshat tries to understand and explain Islam through her art
Going to Hell? Tickets, Please
An exhibition in Scotland looks at the various ways people celebrate death and the afterlife
The Battle for Truth
A new history of the Battle of Britain sets out to dispel some enduring myths about an epic struggle
DEPARTMENTS
World Watch
WHAT DO YOU THINK?
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