TIME EUROPE
October 23, 2000, Vol. 156 No. 17
The Many Minds of Arafat
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Arafat was thoroughly on the defensive, beset too by the frustration
building up among his people. And they have often resorted
to rage. Rock throwers in the street have a number of tactical
attractions. In the asymmetric struggle with the mighty Israeli
army, the Palestinians would appear the victims. That would
galvanize sympathetic Arab and European pressure behind his
cause. A judicious level of violence had wrung Israeli concessions
before: the Jerusalem tunnel uprising in 1996 had forced Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to follow through on a delayed
territorial withdrawal. And it could serve as a safety vent
for all that frustration long pent inside Palestinians.
That's when Arafat decided to marshal his Tanzim forces-maybe 2,000 street
enforcers armed with automatic weapons and more or less loyal
to his Fatah wing of the hydra-headed Palestinian cause-to
prepare for an appropriate opportunity. Arafat, the Tanzim
bosses say, explicitly warned them that clashes would come
because Israel "wanted" to spark violence. It is tough to
draw a solid line between Arafat's meetings and last week's
violence. The Tanzim, to be sure, has its own agenda.
For Arafat, it was a chancy gamble to risk so much on a chaotic army of
armed and unarmed rioters rampaging in a mix of calculation
and spontaneity. He nominally controls, all told, a host of
10 to 13 security organizations, totaling perhaps 40,000-modestly
armed police in blue, secret-service agents in black, paramilitary
commandos in green, and plainclothes spies, each owing allegiance
to a variety of factional masters.
The Tanzim (which means the "organization") is led by rival warlords
who pose a threat to Arafat's authority. Marwan Barghouti,
40, who helped orchestrate the six-year intifadeh from exile
in Jordan, built himself a nice power base in the West Bank
Tanzim until Arafat slapped his face a year ago for daring
to challenge the Palestinian Authority. Then Arafat elevated
another activist, Hussein Sheikh, to take over Barghouti's
work among Fatah. And then Arafat changed tack again, publicly
kissing Barghouti on the forehead late this summer. Both men
claim to lead the Tanzim, both see their prominence in the
violence as the path to power. Add to them the radicals of
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, bent on wiping out Israel-and diminishing
Arafat's authority-and the mix is impossible to control.
When Sharon went to the Temple Mount to say "It's ours"-in-your-face confirmation
that the Palestinians would never get a deal on Jerusalem
that they could accept-it was pure provocation. Palestinians
would inevitably express their anger. The Chairman was apparently
ready to seize on it too. As a Tanzim chief tells it, Barghouti
had visited Arafat in his Ramallah office the day before.
"What do you think of Sharon's visit?" Barghouti asked. Arafat
allegedly responded, "I want to light a fire, and I want it
to burn the Israelis."
Israelis certainly believe Arafat issued such an order. Ironically,
both the Tanzim and Israel share an interest in pinning direct
responsibility on him for the conflagration that ensued. For
the Fatah men, it legitimizes them in Palestinian eyes and
buffs their leader's sagging popular strength. For the Israelis,
it gives a person to blame and call on to stop the violence.
They can criticize Arafat both ways: What kind of partner
is he if he won't call off the uprising? What kind of a partner
is he if he can't? MORE>>
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