The Marshall Plan speech at Harvard was a remarkable offer of help, but it was made with the proviso that the European states must get their act together if the U.S. were to come to their aid. The British embassy in Washington did not think it was even wo rth the cable charges to send a copy of Marshall's speech in advance. Fortunately, the BBC correspondent in Washington sent a report, which was heard on the morning news by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary. Bevin flung the bedclothes off and sa id, "This is it, and we will do the marshaling of the Europeans."

Bevin was as good as his word, and Britain played a leading part in securing the response from Europe, which Marshall had made a condition. But it soon became clear that economic aid alone would not be enough, that recovery required a guarantee of securit y. No one, however, believed Truman would be re-elected in 1948, and until this was known, little progress could be made with the idea of a North Atlantic Treaty. The most that Britain's envoy, Sir Oliver Franks, could get out of the State Department was, "We hear you, Mr. Ambassador." Only when the election was settled was the way open to negotiate NATO.