Some critics say the U.S. was motivated at the time by self-interest, taking advantage of the weakness of Europe and Britain to establish its own hegemony. But it was the long-sighted view that Truman and Marshall took of those interests that counted, and the recognition that it was in the U.S.'s interest not to let Europe fall under Soviet domination. The critics retort that we now know there was no real danger from Russia, but that is wisdom after the event. What counted was the fear of Russia, and I sa w enough of Europe in those years to know that this was a reality.

What is more, Stalin understood that fear and how to exploit it. Although the Soviet Union had not yet acquired atomic weapons and knew very well that the Americans had, Stalin was prepared to take the risk and pressure the West into withdrawing from Berl in. If the U.S. and Britain had not given a sharper response than Stalin expected, he might have succeeded. When he realized that he had gone too far, he backed down in a characteristic sideways movement. No one who lived through the Berlin blockade and a irlift can have any doubt of how real was the fear that we were on the edge of a Third World War. If Europe went on to achieve a remarkable recovery, it was thanks to the resolution of the U.S. and its allies.