Power and pageantry will be on conspicuous display this week as the heads of the world's seven leading industrial nations meet in Lyons, France, for their annual three-day summit. There will be gourmet banquets supervised by local three-star chef Paul Bocuse, a dazzling fireworks display at the Fourviere Basilica, and a rock concert projected onto a giant TV screen in the historic Place Bellecour. Of course, there will also be high-level discussions of economic and political issues ranging from foreign aid and debt relief to the Middle East peace process, Bosnia and the Russian elections. As host of this Group of Seven conference, French President Jacques Chirac is hoping to burnish the international prestige of his 13-month-old administration--and als o boost his mediocre standing in opinion polls.

Not that the two-time former Prime Minister is any stranger to the world stage. During his first year as President, Chirac has often managed to dominate it. Less than a month after taking office in May 1995, the neo-Gaullist leader sparked widespread i nternational protests by announcing the temporary resumption of nuclear tests in the Pacific. On his first international trip, to last year's G-7 in Halifax, he launched the idea of a Franco-British Rapid Reaction Force that helped break up the military a nd diplomatic logjam in Bosnia. Following a historic visit to Lebanon in April, Chirac dispatched his Foreign Minister on a shuttle mission that--though annoying to Washington--helped forge an Israeli-Hizballah cease-fire. Last month French troops interve ned in the Central African Republic to put down an army mutiny. And in Berlin three weeks ago, NATO foreign ministers approved a largely French-inspired plan to grant greater European defense autonomy within the alliance. Following the foreign policy iner tia during the ailing Francois Mitterrand's last years in power, Chirac's message was loud and clear: France is back!

French political analysts generally give Chirac better marks for his performance abroad than at home, where high unemployment and an austere economic program have led to social unrest, including crippling strikes and demonstrations. Chirac's internatio nal activism results not only from the institutions of the Fifth Republic, which give the President special responsibility over foreign affairs, but also from his own temperament. "Chirac has an audacious personality," says Thierry de Montbrial, director of the French Institute of International Relations. "He likes to take risks." But if Chirac's style and sense of French grandeur are reminiscent of his political idol, Charles de Gaulle, the substance of his foreign policy is often at odds with the Gaullist tradition.

Witness Chirac's decision to bring France back into the NATO military fold from which the general bolted 30 years ago. The government announced last December that France would henceforth attend meetings of NATO defense ministers and rejoin its military committee and planning bodies (though not the integrated command). That move reflected a tactical shift by Chirac, who finally gave up on his longtime aim of creating an independent European defense entity. That aim was satisfied, at least in theory, in Berlin in early June at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers. The participants agreed to the principle of Combined Joint Task Forces. These allow European members to use NATO troops and equipment to launch peacekeeping operations in which the U.S. might no t want to take part.

If Washington was gratified by the French rapprochement with NATO, it was less pleased over Chirac's independent initiative last April to ease the Israeli-Hizballah conflict in southern Lebanon. Chirac dispatched Foreign Minister Herve de Charette to t he region on April 15 to work for a truce. When U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived five days later, he found that Charette, in the words of one U.S. official, had been "knocking on doors trying to get into the middle of what was happe ning." Though Christopher and Charette stayed in phone contact throughout their parallel shuttle missions, the Secretary of State found the French presence annoying.

French officials claim they acted quickly because of the "disproportionate" force of the Israeli operation and because the U.S. stance was initially so pro-Israeli that Washington could not win the confidence of other Middle East parties. Fra nce, on the other hand, supported Lebanese sovereignty, recognized Syria's special role in the region and maintained a "critical dialogue" with Iran, enabling Paris to urge Tehran to lean on its Hizballah clients. At the same time, the French sa y they sought to complement, not hinder, U.S. efforts. "Israel and America finally understood," says Yves Doutriaux, deputy spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry, "that it's useful to have the French involved, because we understand the r egion and can give security guarantees to all parties."

Though Charette raised some American hackles with his claim to have originated "80% of the ideas" contained in the April 26 cease-fire agreement, French proposals clearly influenced the final accord. And by winning a place on the five-nation cease-fire monitoring group, France gained a modest foothold in the Middle East peace process. The French initiative helped re-establish Paris' claim to a special relationship with the Arab world--once a keystone of De Gaulle's foreign policy.

It was probably in Bosnia that Chirac's activism was most successful. Says a presidential aide: "As soon as he took office, he knew what he didn't want in Bosnia--humiliation of our soldiers, empty initiatives with no solution." On his first trip to Washington as President, in June 1995, Chirac insisted on more direct American involvement and called for formation of a Rapid Reaction Force to respond more effectively to Serbian aggression. Though Bill Clinton's Administration eventually orches trated the Dayton accords, says a U.S. government analyst, "Chirac played a critical role in stiffening everybody's backbone when things could have taken a turn for the worse."

Chirac, who once branded pro-Europeans as a "foreign party," has emerged as one of the staunchest defenders of European integration. "The first objective of my term in office will be to work for the success of Europe," he told TIME last fall. Strongly committed to the establishment of a single currency by 1999, Chirac is convinced that France's future must pass through Europe--a Europe, however, that respects national sovereignties and traditions. He has nonetheless managed to irk s ome European partners during his first year in office, browbeating the Dutch over lenient drug policies and canceling scheduled meetings with the Prime Ministers of Belgium and Italy because of criticism of his nuclear tests. Chirac's abrupt decision last February to professionalize and downsize the French military infuriated the Germans.

As for France's other major partner, the U.S., Chirac has been critical of Washington's declining aid to the developing world. French officials point to a report published by the Office for Economic Cooperation and Development last week showing that U. S. aid declined from $9.9 billion to $7.3 billion between 1994 and '95, falling behind that of Japan ($14.5 billion), France ($8.4 billion) and Germany ($7.5 billion). Chirac told TIME last year, "It is unimaginable that America always wants to decid e everything and pays less and less." Clinton is sure to hear more of the same in Lyons this week.

Still, both sides rate the personal rapport between Clinton and Chirac as excellent, and American officials generally applaud the French President's cooperation. "Chirac is different," says a U.S. government analyst. "With him, there is not that automatic tendency to distinguish himself from the U.S. His impulse is to look for ways to cooperate with us." Not a very Gaullist attitude. But as Chirac says, "Gaullism is pragmatism." By that definition, the current occupant of the Elysee Palace is a worthy successor to the general.

--With reporting by Scott MacLeod/Paris