EUROPE	FEBRUARY 23, 1998 VOL. 151 NO. 8
	In The Spotlight Of A Crisis As Europe worries about U.S. foreign policy, it confronts its own inadequacy By LAWRENCE FREEDMAN ost European governments are watching the unfolding events in the Persian Gulf with a deep sense of unease. They are fully persuaded that Saddam Hussein's word cannot be trusted and that he is seeking to protect a substantial and truly frightening capacity to wage chemical and biological warfare. They do not doubt the importance of upholding U.N. resolutions. But they are also worried that Washington has yet to explain convincingly how it can solve this problem by military means, particularly air strikes. The American strategy is to coerce Saddam into allowing U.N. inspectors unimpeded access to all suspicious sites by threatening him with attacks on a massive scale if he fails to comply. Europeans listen when they are told that targets will be chosen with care and attacked with precision, but then fret about civilian casualties if cruise missiles veer off in the wrong direction or intelligence turns out to be faulty. Even if all goes according to plan they cannot see how Saddam can be hurt without the Iraqi people suffering even more. And what happens, they wonder, if after two weeks of intensive bombardment, the Iraqi leader still refuses to budge? Won't that entrench his power by further demonstrating that he can survive all that the Americans can throw at him? These thoughts are painful for West European governments not only because they lead to a questioning of the wisdom of their most important ally, but also because they can do little about them. Crises such as these always throw into relief the inadequacy of the European Union as an independent actor in international politics. The demands of unanimity ensure that all statements on controversial matters tend towards the bland. Moreover, the E.U.'s two most active participants in international affairs, Britain and France, prefer the United Nations Security Council as a forum for expressing their views. Their views also diverge in significant respects. Although Britain currently holds the presidency of the E.U. it has made no attempt to qualify its position in support of the American stance. Britain, in fact, sees itself as an architect of the current tough policy as it was actively involved in drafting U.N. Resolution 687 back in April 1991. British public opinion always responds well to the notion that the country has a special vocation when it comes to dealing with brutal dictators, as well as a special relationship with the United States. This was reaffirmed earlier this month when Tony Blair met with Bill Clinton in Washington. Like all Prime Ministers, Blair enjoys reminding American Presidents that when the chips are down the United States has only one truly reliable ally. By contrast, the French instinct is always to find a way of distinguishing its policies from those of the United States on almost any issue. Here the French government has its own interests. Back in the 1970s when he was Prime Minister, President Jacques Chirac cultivated Saddam Hussein as a French client, and this led to major orders for French weapons during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Although President Francois Mitterrand took a firm stand against Iraqi aggression in 1990 when Kuwait was annexed, he still sent off numerous emissaries in a futile search for a diplomatic settlement that could be claimed for France. The government still sees mileage in presenting France as the European country most sensitive to Arab concerns. The shared U.N. status but contrary policies of London and Paris make it impossible to forge a common European policy. Other European governments are left in an uncomfortable position. They are wary of stating their misgivings about the operation too explicitly. This would be counter-productive on the assumption that the best way to resolve the crisis is to convince Iraq that it is isolated rather than the United States. More seriously, they are more than aware of the irritation caused in Washington by allies muttering from the sidelines. Indeed to counter criticisms of free-loading allies sitting on their hands while the Americans take risks for the global good, the more Atlanticist governments have made small gestures of solidarity. Thus a number of European countries, including Germany, are now prepared to offer logistics support. This crisis comes at a time when there are real concerns in Europe about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy, prompted by congressional assertiveness at a time of presidential weakness. Big decisions have to be taken by June about the future of the stabilisation force in Bosnia, where Europeans are looking for a continuing American troop commitment. There is great resentment about attempts to penalise Europeans for economic contacts with rogue states such as Iran, and alarm at the refusal to pay dues to the United Nations and the IMF. Perhaps the most exasperating thing about this latest Gulf crisis for Europeans is that the ineffectuality of their response reduces further their influence in Washington at a time when they are already having difficulty making themselves heard. Lawrence Freedman is professor of war studies at King's College, London and the author, with Ephraim Karsh, of The Gulf Conflict (Faber)
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