MIDDLE EAST	FEBRUARY 23, 1998 VOL. 151 NO. 8
	Doomsday Shell Game A climate of anxiety afflicts Israelis as they contemplate a chemical and biological nightmare By LISA BEYER /TEL AVIV addam Hussein says he'll leave Israel out of the conflict this time and for the moment, Israeli commentators, politicians and army officers are all giving their public the same message: that in the event of a new U.S.-led assault on Iraq, Saddam is unlikely to strike out at Israel as he did 19 times during the 1991 Gulf War. But the experts also concede that somebody as unpredictable as Saddam might just lash out anyway-with potentially calamitous results. The result is a climate of simmering anxiety in Israel. While officials activate hotlines to Washington, exercise with Patriot anti-missile missiles and order planeloads of anthrax-fighting medicines, tens of thousands of Israelis line up each day for hours at a time to receive gas masks that will supposedly see them through a chemical or biological strike. But Israel's primary defense is deterrence. Saddam must know that while Israel turned the other cheek in 1991, it almost surely would not do so again. Says military commentator Gerald Steinberg, "Restraint is not an option." Jitters about Saddam turned to jolts in late January when U.N. chief weapons inspector Richard Butler told the New York Times he believed the Iraqis still had enough biological weapons material to "blow away Tel Aviv or wherever." It is this material and whatever chemical arms Saddam may have that cause the greatest worry. The 39 conventional Scud missiles that hit Israel in 1991 terrorized the population but killed only two people directly. Four suffocated in their gas masks, and 68 died of heart attacks. Israeli intelligence believes Saddam not only has the missiles and launchers needed to deliver chemical and biological weapons, but also the weapons themselves. In addition to the 30 biological and chemical warheads destroyed by the U.N., the Iraqis have themselves acknowledged producing an additional 45 biological ones before Desert Storm. They claim they destroyed those warheads as well but have produced no proof. As for chemical warheads, the Israelis argue that even if Saddam has no more, he can "easily" make new ones in facilities untouched by U.N. inspectors. Israel intelligence counts "a few" Scud missiles left in Saddam's arsenal and two to five Scud launchers intact. Saddam could also attempt an attack by plane, though an Iraqi bomber would probably not survive Israel's air defenses. If Saddam has the means, he may not have the motive. The Israeli military officially deems the probability of an Iraqi strike "negligible." In 1991, Saddam brought Israel into the war in an attempt to drive a wedge between the Western and Arab countries arrayed against him. This time, however, the U.S. is not relying on any such coalition for support. Before the 1991 war, Saddam explicitly promised to attack Israel, whereas today his officials, both publicly and in back-channel communications have sworn off such an assault. What's more, by bombing Israel, he would be inviting--if not assuring--massive retaliation. Israeli officials say that the warning has gone out to Saddam, through the U.S., that Israel's response to an attack would be "devastating," a word chosen, presumably, to conjure up the nuclear arsenal Israel does not openly acknowledge possessing. To paraphrase the newspaper Yediot Aharonot, if Iraq strikes with weapons it doesn't have, Israel will respond with weapons it doesn't have. In truth, Israel would hesitate before using nuclear arms. "They are only a doomsday option," says a retired Israeli general. Still, Israel can punish Iraq badly using conventional means. One option is for Israel to reply with its Jericho ground-to-ground missiles, which have a range of 1,500 km. Aerial raids are another possibility, although they would entail the risk of losing pilots and the complication of overflying Jordan. Israel might also airlift troops into Western Iraq to search the deserted landscape for Scud launchers; an elite air force unit has been training for that task at least since 1991. It was only the insistence of the U.S. that kept Israel from striking back in 1991. In remarks to cnn two weeks ago, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said the U.S. again "would prefer very strongly" that Israel refrain from any counterblow. That provoked pique in Jerusalem and sparked a lightning-quick meeting between Cohen and Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai in Munich. After their talk, Cohen said the Israelis would exercise their right of self-defense "as they see fit." His change of tone seemed to reflect an American understanding that, whatever Washington might wish, the Israelis are convinced they cannot idly absorb another bombardment without seriously compromising their powers of deterrence. Despite the near certainty of a ruinous reprisal, there is one scenario in which Saddam might find a reason to lash out at Israel. If, during a U.S. onslaught, he becomes convinced his time is up, Israeli intelligence believes he may, like Samson, bring the house down to take his enemies with him. It is this possibility, in part, that explains why Israelis aren't entirely buying their government's assurances about "low probabilities." A recent poll showed 36% thought an assault by Iraq was likely--and the demand for gas masks has not diminished --With Reporting by Aharon Klein /Tel Aviv
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