CANADA	MARCH 16, 1998 VOL. 151 NO. 10
	Saving The Quebec Liberals Moderate nationalism--as supported by most Francophones- By ALAIN DUBUC hy did Daniel Johnson resign? "Too close to the separatists," say Liberal strategists from Quebec. Not nationalist enough, says French-speaking public opinion in Quebec. These contradictory interpretations illustrate Johnson's incapacity to deliver a coherent message during his four years as Quebec's Liberal leader. But they also show that Johnson's successor will inherit a party that is shattered and nearly impossible to lead. The Liberal Party of Quebec, traditionally a vehicle for change and modernity, has suffered badly from the polarization that the sovereignty movement has imposed on political life. Formerly a party of ideas, the Quebec Liberals have become the party of a single idea, a rallying point for those who oppose separation. The term rainbow coalition does not easily apply to a group whose colors tend to clash. Behind the "no" of the referendum--this single word that now sums up the Liberals' role--one finds, in effect, a very heterogeneous crowd. It embraces Anglophones and speakers of other languages who feel an attachment to Canada and are uncertain of their status; classical federalists who are close to the Liberal Party of Canada; moderate Francophone nationalists; and a fringe that flirts with sovereignty without making the leap. Rather than a rainbow coalition, let's talk about a pizza all dressed, with too many anchovies. What formerly held this party together was a moderate nationalist doctrine, which must be understood in its nonpejorative sense. It embodies the conviction that while Quebec should remain at the heart of the Canadian federation, it is a nation with its own language and culture. This is what for 40 years has led the Liberals, who were never a branch office of the federal party, to see the state apparatus of Quebec as the government of this nation and to seek the changes that would give Quebec the recognition and the protections that its minority status demands. This doctrine reflects the feelings of a majority of Francophones. The Anglophones have resigned themselves to support it in order to avoid marginalization. But finding an equilibrium has never been easy. The task became nearly impossible after the failures of Meech Lake and Charlottetown, which left the Quebec Liberals without a program or a plan, and after the victory of Jean Chretien and his uncompromising vision of federalism, which so angers Quebec Francophones. The rise of Lucien Bouchard and his quasi-victory in the 1995 referendum did the rest. The post-referendum shock broke the alliances of the federalist family beyond repair. Most Quebec Anglophones became radicalized, either ceding to the partitionist temptation or applauding Ottawa's tough-love strategy. But Francophones, even when they oppose sovereignty, hope that separation, if it comes to that, will take place with the least acrimony possible. These are more than strategic differences. They relate to something fundamental--identity--and they oppose those in the federalist camp who are Canadian first to those in the same camp who are Quebeckers first. Johnson, a clumsy politician who feels ill at ease in the unity debate, was unable to maneuver in these troubled waters. He was not helped, one must say, by the strategy of Plan B, which is popular in English Canada but is seen as aggressive by most Quebec nationalists, whether they voted yes or no in 1995. Nor was he aided by the federal reference to the Supreme Court of the secession issue; by the Millennium Scholarships, with their intrusion in a provincial domain; or by Ottawa's announced intention to intervene directly in the next Quebec elections. All are decisions that weakened the federalist cause. Is there a way out? One thing is clear: the dream of Chretien's strategists, who hoped to solve problems by remote control of a federalist in their image in Quebec, leads directly to disaster. The Quebec Liberal Party would not survive such heavy-handedness. Don't forget that Prime Minister Chretien is very unpopular with Quebec Francophones, and even more so when it comes to unity. The more Ottawa interferes in Quebec affairs, the more it drags down the Quebec Liberals. The only way to give back to the Quebec Liberal Party its rightful place is for the next leader to return to the traditional formula. That is, to make explicit that the party is both clearly Canadian and profoundly Quebecois, to defend vigorously Quebec's membership in confederation but also energetically to defend Quebec's specific nature and its desire for change. Is that possible? This is what is behind the cult of Jean Charest, a politician whose talent for reflecting the two poles of Quebec's reality is almost magical. Charest can be perceived as a great Canadian and a true Quebecker. There is nothing artificial about this duality. It is where the Quebec mainstream locates itself. Two-thirds of Quebec does not want a referendum, and two-thirds also wants to stay in Canada--if the country agrees to change. Alain Dubuc is chief editorialist of Montreal's La Presse
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