The Afghan Way of War

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The war's action may be shifting south. Late last week both sides mobilized in preparation for a trench battle for control of the air base at Bagram--the front north of Kabul. "We will advance to the gates of Kabul within two weeks," predicts a senior rebel officer. Sources told TIME that the Alliance, which is outnumbered 2 to 1 by Taliban forces around Kabul, has asked for close air support from American attack helicopters. So far, the Pentagon has demurred, but AH-64 Apache choppers are already suspected to be in the region, with A-10s on the way. If U.S. gunships take to the skies above Kabul, the Taliban will likely raid what is left of their stash of 250 antiaircraft Stinger missiles--arms sent to the mujahedin in the mid-'80s by the cia--to try to shoot the Americans down.

The Pentagon would prefer to continue blasting Taliban lines with B-52 carpet bombs while the Northern Alliance does the dirty work on the ground. Though the number of U.S. sorties flown daily last week dipped from 100 to 75, the bombers were able to hit harder and with more focused rage. U.S. special-ops spotters deployed to the front more than doubled last week to almost 100 men. Target guides on the ground allowed the U.S. to pulverize Taliban troops in the north with a pair of BLU-82 "daisy cutters"--15,000-lb., minivan-size killing machines carried one at a time in the belly of MC-130 cargo planes. When detonated three feet above the ground, the bomb's slurry of ammonium nitrate and aluminum dust wipes out everything within a half-mile radius. Those who are not killed often suffer ruptured lungs or broken eardrums.

The weapon's intent--like the cluster bombs the U.S. began unleashing a few weeks ago--is to terrorize enemy troops into surrender. The Pentagon believes such intimidation is beginning to take hold. Though the Northern Alliance claimed massive enemy desertions, U.S. commanders know better than to count on a collapse of the Taliban's fighting zeal.

Taliban resolve has caused mounting anxiety among U.S. military strategists, particularly because until last week the Northern Alliance showed few signs of war readiness. Three weeks ago, near Mazar-i-Sharif, a rebel charge was turned back by a Taliban counteroffensive because the Alliance's four rival commanders failed to coordinate their attacks. In the north, the Alliance's loose-knit guerrilla bands are plagued by ethnic infighting, inexperience and customary drug use. The preferred narcotic is a potent, pungent hashish that is smoked by Alliance and Taliban soldiers alike from dinner until midnight. Alliance soldiers say they make up for their lack of Western-style military discipline with versatility. "We can do everything," says Fazel, a tank commander in the Farkhar district. "But we don't do anything very well."