The Afghan Way of War

(6 of 7)

Though the Taliban came to power using "maneuver" warfare--compensating for a manpower disadvantage by attacking on the run from the beds of their Datsun pickups--the regime more recently has won by attrition, digging forces in deep and attacking in mass formations. But the American bombings have flushed Taliban soldiers into the open and forced many of them to return to their roots--the mobile, hit-and-run guerrilla tactics they know best. "Their forces seem to be composed largely of fanatics," says Julie Sirrs, a former analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, "or conscripts whom the Taliban are willing to toss into the fire." The hardest core--about 10,000 men, most of them foreigners--will fight to the death. "When they have to secure a position, they secure it," says Haron Amin, the Alliance's representative in Washington who has fought the Taliban. "They don't worry about their casualties."

The Alliance has its own elite corps deployed near Kabul. Visiting Western journalists often portray the Alliance's militia of part-time, agrarian soldiers as representative of the rebel force as a whole. But that picture is misleading. A zarbati, or strike unit, of some 1,200 uniformed, well-trained fighters is massed north of the capital. The best of the bunch, the Guards Brigade, was created by the late mujahedin commander Ahmed Shah Massoud--even in death the spiritual leader of the Northern Alliance--and comprises several infantry assault battalions backed up by Russian T-55 and T-62 tanks. The Guards have already moved into position northeast of Kabul for a possible raid on the city. Winter won't necessarily deter them: against the Soviets, Afghan guerrillas fought brilliantly in the cold, fortified by high-protein energy bars made of nuts and fruits ground to a pulp and dried into a gristly purple block.

After two decades of conflict, rebel commanders are patient to a fault. But they have never undertaken a major offensive involving thousands of troops organized in numerous brigades, each with its own artillery and armored vehicles. "An offensive of this size is going to be a first for all these commanders," says a Western military specialist. "And it's not at all clear how they'll do." The Alliance forces stationed north of Kabul possess 100 tanks and other armored vehicles, but they may not be deployed in ways that inflict maximum damage. Afghans tend to split their armor into small portions to use as mobile artillery or infantry support. But, says a Western analyst, "that's not how you break lines and sow confusion in the enemy's rear."

That's why the Alliance needs American advisers, and why it may wait for more carpet bombs to fall before it tries to take Kabul. The U.S. hopes the fall of Mazar will set off a string of rebel victories in the north, demoralize Taliban forces in the rest of the country and inspire wholesale desertions. Now that a major city has fallen, says Sirrs, "the momentum will start to turn against the Taliban." But those who don't defect will melt into their surroundings, lie low and wait to pounce. "The Taliban is unlike anything we've ever seen before," says a senior Pentagon official. "If you destroy the military capability of the Taliban and you take away 90% of its following and the rest go into the hills, you still have a movement."