Worst-Case Scenario

Few still hope that Yasser Arafat could ever be Israel's partner in peace, but many now feel that his predicament could become the catalyst of a much larger conflict. If it began to unfold, it could unleash pent-up forces and take on a disastrous momentum of its own. When the possibility arose that Arafat might be killed in the ruins of his headquarters, there was undisguised panic among Arab governments. What they dreaded also greatly alarmed their European counterparts, as well as the U.S. and even the Israelis themselves: uncontrollable mass demonstrations in Arab capitals that might compel reluctant rulers to try to attack Israel in turn.

How would it begin? In one grim scenario, it would start with Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who is in the most exposed position of all. His controlled media have long been replete with fervent anti-Israeli propaganda in a deliberate attempt to deflect attention from corruption and mismanagement at home. Endless television replays of the most brutal scenes of the Israeli occupation have hammered home the message that Egypt's most urgent concern is the plight of the Palestinians. At the same time, what is still a military-based regime justifies large expenditures on the armed forces amid extreme poverty by boasting of their strength. Mubarak therefore risks becoming the prisoner of his own propaganda: If Palestine is all-important and Egypt that strong, why not use its strength against the Israelis? The least dangerous Egyptian move would be disastrous in its consequences. Violating Anwar Sadat's peace treaty, cutting itself off from vital U.S. aid, the Egyptian army could send part of its vast forces--say, the four tank divisions and eight mechanized divisions with 1,600 battle tanks, including first-line U.S. M1A1s--into the Sinai peninsula to threaten the Israeli frontier. Compelling the Israelis to mobilize their own army, which would very likely freeze any further action against the Palestinians, would make sense as a piece of military gamesmanship. But strategically it would be catastrophic, because if the Egyptians acted, Syria's young and insecure President Bashar Assad would most likely feel compelled to compete with them by sending his own armored forces--seven divisions with 2,000 tanks--to threaten the Golan frontier. And then even King Abdullah of Jordan, who greatly values his peace treaty with Israel, might come under irresistible pressure from his Palestinian subjects to send his two armored and two mechanized divisions, equipped with some 700 tanks, opposite the Jordanian frontier.