Looking For Help In The Wrong Place

The idea is in the air. With America's armed forces stretched thin around the globe and its sandblasted soldiers grumbling that they want to go home, why not share the burden of bringing security to Iraq? In the White House Rose Garden last week, President Bush urged other nations to contribute "militarily and financially" toward creating a "free and secure Iraq." The Administration seems to think that it can get such help without a new U.N. Security Council resolution. But don't count on it. Under Security Council Resolution 1483, legal authority in Iraq is held not by the U.N. but by the occupying powers, the U.S. and Britain. As long as that is the case, nations like India, France, Russia and Germany won't send in their troops. Even NATO is unlikely to get involved without a resolution granting more power to the U.N., because without one, 17 members of the alliance would be expected to dance to the tune of just two others--the U.S. and Britain. So it's hardly surprising that diplomats at the U.N. say they expect talks on a new resolution to start soon.

Which raises the question: Is an expanded role for the U.N. in Iraq a good idea? The U.N. is staffed with devoted public servants. It is rooted in high ideals, and some of its many fans continue to go all misty-eyed over them. But if the world learned anything in the 1990s, it was surely that the U.N. doesn't work miracles. You don't bring peace to a violent land just by sending in a multinational force wearing blue helmets. True, some missions have been successful, like the Australian-led stabilization of East Timor. But from Somalia, where a humanitarian effort turned into a doomed attempt at nation building; to Rwanda, where U.N. forces failed to prevent a genocide, despite ample warnings that it was coming; to Bosnia, where the Dutch component of a peacekeeping contingent stood by while thousands of Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered in Srebrenica, the record of multilateral forces has hardly been distinguished.

This should not be surprising. Fighting wars is a difficult business. Success depends on an identity of goals between soldiers and their political masters, and a clear chain of command. That's hard to achieve when a force is made up of various nationalities. Even friends don't always agree. There are no closer allies than the U.S. and Britain, but when U.S. General Wesley Clark, then Supreme Commander of NATO forces, asked the British in June 1999 to stop Russian troops from taking control of Pristina airport at the end of the Kosovo war, London bluntly refused. (The precise words of British General Mike Jackson: "Sir, I'm not starting World War III for you.")