Hunt for the Bomb Factories

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So far, in an offensive that began in late December, the 2-12 has cracked an al-Zarqawi bombmaking cell and an Ansar al-Sunnah stronghold, and severely disrupted a nest of nationalist cells composed of former Republican Guard officers and Baathists upon whom the other organizations rely. That has led the insurgents to attack the 2-12 directly. At one point during the Jafr Sakhr operation, a report comes in from 2-12's headquarters. Insurgents are lobbing mortars on the bridge over the Euphrates where Ryan has positioned his tanks. He isn't dismayed. "I was waiting to see how long it would take the enemy to get mad enough about us being on the bridge before he started shooting mortars at us. If he's shooting at us here, he isn't attacking toward Baghdad. We have the bridge cut off, so now the bad guys on the east side of the bridge can't connect with the bad guys on the west side of the bridge." He adds, "The more [the enemy] has to turn and divert his attention to us here in his supply lines, in his safe havens, the less time he's devoted to attacking people in Baghdad." As a result, the car bombs made in the Jafr Sakhr area must now pass through Fallujah to the north or Musayyab to the south, running a gauntlet of U.S. checkpoints before they can reach the capital.

The insurgents in Baghdad claim to be unperturbed by the recent U.S. raids in the tribal heartland. The emir, or prince, controlling many of the nationalist cells in the capital and in the Jafr Sakhr region, which Ryan's 2-12 is targeting, told TIME that he knew of the seizures but declared his group could recover. Ryan concedes he is only disrupting those networks. If nothing else, he believes, it helps to buy time for democracy and a central government to take hold. But he is aware that the offensive will slow after the 2-12 leaves Iraq in February. It will take time for its replacement battalion to get up to speed with the strategy. And it's a daunting task. Abu Mohammed, an Iraqi guerrilla leader in Baghdad, told TIME, "If you dig anywhere in Iraq, you'll find one of two things: oil or weapons."

Ryan and his men already have recorded a chilling inventory of what has been available to the enemy. In House 71, for example, they find an array of weapons-- a crank-handle detonator, spools of detonation cord, dozens of mortars, thousands of rounds of 12.7-mm ammo, a sackful of yellow grenades and other bombmaking materials--buried in pits all over a yard in which a herd of sheep and goats graze. A pocket notebook inside the ramshackle dwelling proves to be a huge intelligence boon, listing weapons and the cell leaders to whom they were distributed. An Arabic-speaking Army specialist, born to Palestinian and Puerto Rican parents, scans the pages. "He's written everything here--who he gave what to. He's very stupid," the soldier says with a smile. The pages connect a lot of dots to insurgent bosses Ryan has been tracking.