Book Excerpt: Losing the Green Light

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There has never been much support in the United States in either party for ratifying Kyoto. It was seen as fatally flawed, largely because it didn't apply to nations such as China and India, which, along with the rest of Asia, are expected to account for as much as 70 percent of the global growth in greenhouse gases over the next 15 years. There was also considerable skepticism about the ability of any developed nation to meet its aggressive goals along with concern about the economic costs. Recognizing political reality, the Clinton Administration, a strong advocate of the protocol, never even sent it to the Senate for ratification.

During the 2000 campaign, candidate Bush made clear his opposition to the treaty itself, but he also argued that the United States should work with other countries to develop new technologies to reduce harmful emissions. He had even expressed support for legislation to require the mandatory reduction in the United States of emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, mercury, and the major greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, from power plants. His inclusion of carbon dioxide was significant. Many Republicans had been arguing for years that carbon dioxide was not a pollutant, and they were bound to oppose any effort to regulate it, as was much of the utility industry. However, a mandatory cap on carbon dioxide emissions was listed as one of the Bush campaign's promises in the thick notebook titled "Transition 2001," the official compendium of the President's campaign promises, which I was given when I was nominated for the EPA position.

Shortly before leaving for Trieste, I met at the White House with Condi Rice, the President's National Security Adviser. I made sure she knew I would be touting the President's campaign commitment to a mandatory cap on carbon dioxide, and she agreed that this was a sound approach. I also checked with the office of the White House chief of staff and got the green light as well. In Trieste I confronted a good deal of skepticism about the Administration's intentions on global climate change. But I assured my G8 counterparts that the President's campaign commitment was solid. By the end of the two-day gathering, we were all able to agree to language committing our respective countries to "take the lead by strengthening and implementing national programs and actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions."

I knew many Republicans in Congress, as well as many utility-industry leaders, had voiced opposition to the President's promise on carbon dioxide. So on the plane home, I wrote a memo to the President summarizing the trip. "I would strongly recommend that you continue to recognize that global warming is a real and serious issue. While not specifically endorsing the targets called for in Kyoto, you could indicate that you are exploring how to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions internally and will continue to do so no matter what else transpires." I concluded, "Mr. President, this is a credibility issue [global warming] for the U.S. in the international community. It is also an issue that is resonating here at home."