High Hopes, Low Expectations

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When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, large numbers of Americans shared his determination to build up U.S. armaments and take a hard stance against Soviet expansionism. But as Reagan prepared for this week's meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva, a TIME poll showed more support for reaching an accommodation with the Soviet Union than at any other time during his presidency. The U.S. public strongly favors making significant progress in talks with the Soviets, particularly on nuclear arms control, even while it is dubious about any likely success. Alkthough a majority of Americans favor development of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a solid 74% indicate a willingness to trade away the proposed missile-defense system for cutbacks in Soviet military power.

The desire for summit deals is hedged by considerable doubt about their feasibility. The survey of 1,020 registered voters,[*] taken Nov. 5 through Nov. 7 by Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., found that while 82% of respondents believed the first summit in six years was a good idea, only 7% expected significant forward movement from the talks, and 16% forecast no progress at all. The Administration's attempts in recent weeks to dampen expectations about summit accomplishments were clearly successful. For example, 86% of those surveyed considered a mutual reduction in nuclear arms a "very important" summit goal, but only 31% thought it likely to happen. More than three-quarters of the survey respondents put a high priority on the two superpowers agreeing to stop interfering in the affairs of Nicaragua and Afghanistan, yet less than one-fifth of them thought such restraint likely to be achieved.

Even if a breakthrough agreement on a vital foreign policy issue could be reached, the survey indicated considerable skepticism about whether it would work: 66% do not believe the Soviets can be trusted to keep their end of the bargain, and a surprising 28% think the U.S. is similarly unlikely to honor the fine print of a pact.

Much of the dubiousness can be laid to misgivings about the two main players in Geneva and their willingness to strive seriously for an arms-control agreement. Despite a flurry of artfully crafted public appearances, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev remains an unknown quantity to the American public. Some 93% of the survey group admitted knowing little or nothing about the new Soviet leader; 47% of those who know at least something about Gorbachev suspect that he cannot be counted upon to honor his end of a bargain. Gorbachev's public relations efforts and his youth (by past Politburo standards) notwithstanding, a majority of Americans consider the new Soviet boss to be part of the old Kremlin leadership, no better or worse than his predecessors.

More surprising are public doubts about the popular Reagan. Only 30% think the President emphasizes arms control over expansion of our nuclear arsenal, although 79% personally favor that position. Fully 50% of those surveyed believe Reagan is determined to build up America's supply of nuclear weapons, but only 12% find that a good idea. Indeed, by 25% to 21%, more voters believe Reagan's nuclear policies increase rather than decrease the threat of war. (A remarkable 46% think those policies have no effect either way.)