Arms Control: Maneuvering Around Square One

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A legitimate, perhaps indispensable part of diplomacy is symbolism. Whenever statesmen get together, it serves to remind the world, and the principals themselves, that for all the complexities of arms control and other matters of discussion, much still depends on individuals. It is not just systems that clash or coexist, but human beings.

What was most significant about the imagery in Geneva last week was not that two men were meeting at the summit--that is, at the peak of personal and national power--but that they were, for nearly five hours, meeting off to one side alone. Their apparent personal rapport, or at least civility and restraint, made the meeting a symbolic success. But on the most important issue confronting them, controlling the arsenals of nuclear weapons, there is no assurance that the "fresh start" and "momentum" they spoke about will actually lead anywhere. Not only was there no resolution of the basic issues dividing the two sides, which could hardly have been expected, but there was no hint of progress toward resolution, a more reasonable hope. How American plans to develop space-based strategic defenses can be reconciled with the quest for deep reductions in strategic offenses remains as much of a conundrum as ever. An American negotiator who is a regular at the ongoing arms-control talks in Geneva remarked, "It's nice to have our bosses wish us luck and urge us to do our best, but the nitty-gritty of our work here is going to be as tough as ever."

Thursday's joint statement required intensive negotiation, yet it was little more than an enumeration of the lowest common denominators of the relationship. On arms control, it mostly reiterated earlier declarations of intent or endorsed vague goals that have already provoked dispute. The "principle" of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms begs such extremely tricky questions as whether gravity bombs aboard bombers (in which the U.S. has an advantage) should be lumped together with more threatening warheads atop large missiles (in which the Soviets have the lead). The statement also promoted the "idea" of an interim compromise on medium-range weapons, which Washington first floated in 1983 and Moscow proposed this fall. But there again, both sides are still a long way from agreement about what kinds of weapons should count.

On the critical issue of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the document contains nothing more than a reaffirmation of a communiqué that Secretrary of State George Shultz signed with former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January, along with a vow to "accelerate the work" of the arms talks. Said one participant in those talks: "To accelerate implies that we were already moving. We weren't, and we still aren't. We're maneuvering for position around square one."

Some of the U.S. officials who came to Geneva with Reagan had hoped the final document would include another reaffirmation, that of the antiballistic-missile (ABM) treaty of 1972. Advocates of arms control within the Administration want to seize every opportunity to commit the U.S. to keeping SDI within the bounds of that treaty. Doing so, they hope, might allay Soviet concerns and induce concessions. Why was there no mention of the ABM treaty in the joint statement?