The Rise Of an Evil Protégé

THE APPRENTICE: Al-Zarqawi has steered al-Qaeda in directions his boss bin Laden probably never intended
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In October 2004, after further meetings with bin Laden's emissary al-Iraqi, al-Zarqawi publicly joined al-Qaeda, becoming the self-proclaimed prince of its operations in the "Land of Mesopotamia." As the jihadist insurgency gained momentum, the open wariness that once characterized al-Zarqawi's dealings with bin Laden dissipated, although counterterrorism officials believe their alliance was rooted more in pragmatism than affection. "Al-Zarqawi needs bin Laden for his credibility," says a U.S. intelligence analyst. "Bin Laden needs al-Zarqawi because he is doing the real work." But the celebrity al-Zarqawi has gained through his reign of terror in Iraq has marginalized bin Laden and shrunk his circle of loyalists. A senior Pakistani intelligence officer says "several hundred" al-Qaeda jihadis, spurred by al-Zarqawi's attacks on U.S. troops, left Afghanistan for Iraq in two waves, one via the gulf and the other across the Iran-Turkmenistan border; scores were killed in Iraq, and many fell in the battle of Fallujah in November 2004.

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Terrorism experts say bin Laden remains the spiritual leader of global jihad but is no longer calling the shots. "Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri may have turned al-Zarqawi into something bigger than themselves," says French counterterrorism expert Roland Jacquard. "Strategically, they didn't have much choice. They needed to give the Iraq jihad the backing and legitimacy of al-Qaeda's direction. But it's turned out to be a very emancipating development for al-Zarqawi." Evidence suggests,though, that he may have gone too far. In October the U.S. released a letter that it said was sent in July from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi--in which bin Laden's deputy urged the Jordanian to refrain from attacking Shi'ites in Iraq. It has provoked the anger of moderate Muslims around the world. Al-Zawahiri suggests such attacks "be put off until the force of the mujahid movement in Iraq gets stronger."

Although some experts speculate that the letter was drawn up by Iranian intelligence to dupe al-Zarqawi, the CIA and Pentagon insist that the 13-page missive is not a forgery and that it reveals differences between the old al-Qaeda leaders and al-Zarqawi over tactics and ideology. At the same time, the letter also indicates an acknowledgment by al-Zawahiri that the al-Qaeda hierarchy has been reordered. "It wasn't the letter of an overall commander pulling the choke chain of a subordinate," says Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corp. think tank in Washington, who believes it is genuine. "It was diplomatic, cajoling, flattering and in essence sucking up to [al-Zarqawi]."