One Thousand and Sixty-Five Days To Go

(3 of 7)

It is one thing to rebuff reporters to protect some policy or principle, a right Cheney has asserted many times before. But this time the only thing Cheney was protecting was himself. If Rule No. 1 of damage control is Get the news out fast, the second is Don't embarrass the boss. Breaking both rules at once is a poor idea. White House counselor Dan Bartlett, communications director Nicolle Wallace and McClellan all recommended to Bush's chief of staff, Andrew Card, and his deputy Karl Rove on Sunday, the day after the shooting, that the White House make an immediate statement and were alarmed that the whole system seemed to have seized up, according to several Republican sources.

How do you make a powerful Vice President do something he doesn't want to do, however much the President needs it? From the earliest days of this Administration, the President has been comfortable having a Vice President who answers only to him and pretty much scares everyone else. When Cheney simply shut down after the accident, there was no one else in the White House with the nerve or clout to bring him back online. Cheney "has a very protective family, plus there is an unfortunate intimidation factor," says a former Administration official. "Very few staff--either in Cheneyworld or Bushworld--are comfortable raising issues in a straightforward manner or giving constructive advice." Over the years and especially during these past hard months, the official says of Cheney, "this has not served him well. There is a culture around him of deference and reverence. More often than not, he is told what people assume he wants to hear rather than what he wants to hear."

After that final nudge from the President Wednesday morning, Cheney retreated to his office with his longtime adviser Mary Matalin, chief of staff David Addington, daughter Liz and, later, his press secretary, Lea Anne McBride, to prepare. Matalin and McBride laid out all the questions being raised about the incident. Cheney just soaked it in "like a sponge," Matalin said, but not only did he not rehearse his answers, he also gave no indication of how he would respond. Matalin heard the full version of the accident only when he taped the interview.

Cheney appeared genuinely shaken by what had happened. "The image of him falling is something I'll never be able to get out of my mind," Cheney said. "I fired, and there's Harry falling. And it was, I'd have to say, one of the worst days of my life, at that moment." But when it came to explaining his delay in getting the story out (see page 32) and his reluctance to speak, the V.P. expressed no regret, which was entirely in character. In any event, it might not have been necessary. White House aides had come to believe that the aggressive way reporters were pursuing the story was working to Cheney's advantage.