The Wild Card

Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shi'ite leader, doesn't like to miss out on the action. As Iraq convulsed in sectarian violence last week, al-Sadr was stuck in Beirut, on the final leg of a grand tour of Middle Eastern capitals. He was being feted by heads of state across the region, a remarkable achievement for a politician-cleric who has neither been elected to any office nor completed his religious education. After hearing news of the destruction of the Shi'ite shrine in Samarra, al-Sadr cut his trip short to return to Iraq to marshal his Mahdi Army, a militia of bristling young Shi'ites who had swarmed the streets, torching Sunni mosques and girding for war. But a government-imposed curfew had closed airports and sealed borders, leaving al-Sadr locked out. His mood was surly. An aide told TIME that when he tried to brief al-Sadr on talks over the formation of Iraq's new government, he snapped, "The government can go to hell."

Damning Iraq's political process comes easy to a man who more than once has pushed it to the edge of the precipice. But these days al-Sadr is part of the process: in December's general elections, his candidates won 32 seats, giving him a decisive voting bloc in the 128-member Shi'ite alliance that dominates the new parliament. But unlike most other Iraqi leaders, al-Sadr commands a genuine popular following, which is why the surge of violence is likely to give him even more influence over the country's future.

To a substantial extent, the prospects of averting a full-blown civil war will depend on how al-Sadr chooses to deploy his militia--as a revenge-seeking lynch mob or as enforcers of Shi'ite restraint. Because of his popularity with the Shi'ite masses, any effort to broker a cease-fire between the sects and form a durable Iraqi government that can contain the violence will require his active cooperation. It's an indication of how badly things are going for the Bush Administration that its hopes are pinned to a man implacably hostile toward the U.S.--and whose supporters were, barely two years ago, fighting U.S. troops on his orders. "We're going to have to hold our noses when we do business with this guy," says a Western adviser to the Iraqi government. "And he's going to enjoy watching us squirm."

That's fine with everyone, as long as al-Sadr keeps his shock troops in check. In the immediate aftermath of the Samarra bombing, he was hearteningly subdued, ordering his followers to refrain from attacking Sunnis. After having participated in the orgy of anti-Sunni violence in the 24 hours following the attack, al-Sadr's fighters gradually responded to their leader's call. In a few places, his supporters were even credited with protecting Sunni mosques. For the more optimistic observers, those events seemed to confirm the notion that it is better to have al-Sadr inside the Iraqi political tent, trying to hold it up, than to leave him outside, threatening to put it to the torch. "This shows that Muqtada is a constructive force in politics," says Salah al-Obeidi, a senior al-Sadr aide. "This is the act of a responsible Iraqi leader."