The Spy Master Cracks the Whip

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Yet in recent weeks, Negroponte and his deputy, the hard-charging Hayden, have driven deep into the CIA's backyard, chewing up its closely guarded turf and trying to bring the agency under their grip. In April Hayden let it be known that his office would be taking over the critical job of terrorism analysis--connecting the dots in all the raw data gathered on terrorists--a role the CIA had jealously guarded for decades. In an unusual public speech, Hayden likened the CIA's slow-to-change attitude about roles and missions to "crowding the ball." Negroponte also fought the agency's objections when he pushed to share more intelligence with spy chiefs of other countries--something the CIA had opposed for years because agents feared that wider distribution could compromise sources. And in March, Negroponte asked the CIA to provide him with a rundown of all its station chiefs worldwide. It was a natural inventory request, but agency officials took umbrage at it anyway. Negroponte, for his part, hinted last month in an interview with TIME that he believed CIA officials were being far too turf conscious. "Station chiefs are for Porter Goss to choose. I am not interested in directing operations ... Am I interested in what they are doing? You're darn right I am," he said.

All those setbacks, however inevitable, were wounding for Goss. The Yale graduate spent a decade after college as a clandestine CIA officer, mostly overseas. After serving nearly 16 years in Congress, much of it on the House Intelligence Committee, Goss eyed Negroponte's job. When the DNI began to take control of the agency that Goss had been named to run, Goss had nowhere to turn. The agency's normally loyal allies on Capitol Hill could not help him fight back because nearly all the lawmakers on the intelligence-oversight committees believed, if anything, that Negroponte wasn't moving fast enough with reform.

And when Goss resisted, Negroponte and Hayden fought back--and played for keeps: DNI officials began to speak critically of Goss to his subordinates, saying he simply wasn't engaged. U.S. officials told TIME that Hayden complained about Goss to members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of private intelligence experts who report directly to the President. Hayden, said the officials, was highly critical of the agency's refusal to get with the DNI program.

Then there was the X factor in Goss's departure: his judgment about people. After bringing with him a boarding party of staff members who seemed to specialize in mishandling personnel matters, Goss promoted Kyle (Dusty) Foggo to be the CIA's executive director and top budget chief. Foggo is now at the center of a growing investigation into a federal bribery case that has already sent former California Congressman Randy (Duke) Cunningham to prison for more than eight years. A source close to the investigation tells TIME that the Justice Department is investigating reports that one of Cunningham's benefactors, Pentagon and CIA contractor Brent Wilkes, a buddy of Foggo's since high school, provided Foggo with improper gifts, such as lavish vacations. A CIA spokesman says Foggo "denies any improper gifts," and Wilkes' lawyer has similarly denied any wrongdoing.