Birth Of A Superpower

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The naval war of 1898 provided the nation with a complete justification of Mahan's theories. The firepower of the American battleships had clearly been overwhelming--a great relief to Roosevelt, who had feared voices in Congress calling instead for lots of small, coastal-defense vessels. Most impressive of all was the performance of the new battleship U.S.S. Oregon, which had steamed from San Francisco to Cuba to partake in the final battle. In fact, so enthusiastic was Congress about the importance of the Navy that it authorized the construction of many more battleships and heavy cruisers.

But the lesson that most impressed itself on Roosevelt was that it had taken the Oregon, steaming at high speed, a full 67 days to complete the 14,700-mile journey around Cape Horn. American navalists and expansionists--and Roosevelt was both--began clamoring for the construction of a canal across Central America, one that, given the turbulent nature of international politics, must be completely under U.S. control. Facing large potential threats in the Atlantic and the Pacific, the U.S. had no choice but to shorten the route between the East and West coasts.

The matter was urgent because Roosevelt and his circle were not the only people who had discovered the influence of sea power on world affairs. Mahan's lessons from history had had an almost universal resonance. Under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany was building a battle fleet as large as the U.S. one and equally fast. France and Russia, now in alliance, were also pouring resources into new construction, as were Italy and Austria-Hungary in the Mediterranean. The most amazing growth, from virtually nowhere, was that of the Japanese navy in the Far East. And all these growing fleets caused the British to spend unprecedented amounts on the Royal Navy in an effort to maintain its centuries-old naval supremacy. The U.S. could not afford to slacken its pace.

The U.S. navalists need not have worried. Within a short while, in March 1901, Roosevelt was elected Vice President under McKinley; six months later, following McKinley's assassination, he was catapulted into the highest office. As early as 1902 he demonstrated the growing clout of the U.S. Navy during the so-called Venezuelan crisis. Venezuela's feckless financial policies and its refusal to pay international debts had led to a blockade of its coastline by various European navies, notably Germany's. Urged on by the nationalist wing of the U.S. press, Roosevelt had instructed Dewey, now an admiral, to patrol with a large force in waters nearby, ostensibly on seasonal fleet maneuvers but with an intent that was clear to all.

It was a tactic that seemed to fit perfectly with the President's motto, "Speak softly, but carry a big stick." Whether it was fully true, as Roosevelt later claimed, that it was U.S. sea power that compelled the Germans to back down, is open to some doubt. But with a compromise debt settlement reached at the Hague, it was becoming clear that the era of European interventions in the western hemisphere had come to an end. Long an empty declaration, the Monroe Doctrine, which had warned Europeans not to interfere in the Americas, was now a reality as a result of American sea power.