Birth Of A Superpower

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All the same, the world remained a dangerous place. There were the German threat to France, the Anglo-German rivalry in the North Sea, the Balkan tinderbox and the unanswered question of Japan's ultimate ambitions. Roosevelt decided a bold move was required to send a message that the U.S. was a global player. In December 1907 he dispatched from Hampton Roads, Va., the "Great White Fleet," consisting of all 16 of the U.S. Navy's modern battleships. They were embarked on what would be a 46,000-mile, 14-month cruise around the world. Here was showing the flag, indeed. Almost a century later, that voyage is still regarded as the apotheosis of Roosevelt's belief in naval power as an instrument of national policy. The stately procession across the Pacific and then through the Indian Ocean, Suez Canal and Mediterranean before returning to the Atlantic seaboard was an impressive logistical feat, even if it confirmed to the U.S. Navy the limited endurance of the older battleships and produced a remarkable number of desertions in Australian ports. But the world public was not to know of that. A million people had assembled in San Francisco harbor to watch the fleet depart; half a million Australians greeted it in Sydney. Even the anxiously prepared visit to Tokyo Bay had gone well.

A short while after the Great White Fleet's return, Roosevelt relinquished the presidency. To his successor, William Howard Taft, he had one message: Do not divide the fleet. The Mahanian principle of concentrating the main battle fleet in one theater remained in place. It would still be there in 1914 when the Panama Canal, instigated by T.R., finally opened. Only during the Second World War, when the U.S. Navy became the largest in the world, would the U.S. possess a two-ocean fleet.

But the foundations of its maritime supremacy had been laid, and firmly, by this most energetic of U.S. Presidents. It is true that after 1909, the U.S. took a bit of a breather in world affairs, retreating to the side of the stage as the European crisis unfolded. But it never stopped building warships. And the country would be summoned back to the center of international politics in 1917. Despite the isolationist pressures of the interwar years, the U.S. would never be able, or willing, to abandon its pivotal role. The country's later trajectory would have made T.R. feel justified, and proud. He had always been convinced that it was impossible for the U.S. to avoid becoming the greatest world power of the 20th century; the only choice was whether it would do so well or poorly. And the trick was to turn the theory of Mahan's principles about sea power into effective practice, for the furtherance of American interests and values. No U.S. President did that better.

Kennedy is director of International Security Studies at Yale. His latest book is The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations (Random House)