Russia's New World Order

Reclaiming The Hood
An important priority for a re-energized Russia has been the "near abroad": the former territories of the Soviet empire. To watch what were once coerced satellites like Estonia and Poland rush to join nato and the E.U. has been hard enough. But the nato membership likely to be sought by Ukraine, which shares a 2,063-km border with Russia, raises primal fears of encirclement. Kremlin propaganda already blames the sudden collapse of empire and economic dislocation on perfidy by ingrate "junior brothers" such as Ukraine, as well as hostile plots by the U.S. and nato. Moreover, a group of military officers and international-relations experts in Moscow is advancing new reasons for a buffer zone. They argue that the 21st century will be dominated by a "war over resources," says Yury Fedorov, an expert on Russia at Chatham House in London. Its prevailing ethos will be: "If you have a lot of resources, and I need them, I may use my gun to take them."

Moscow's heavy-handed interference in Ukraine's 2004 orange revolution hints at how easily discrepant views about the near abroad could flame up. The West viewed Viktor Yushchenko's victory as the triumph of people power over a malign Soviet-style government; Moscow saw an anti-Russian plot by the cia acting through democracy-promoting ngos. Should Ukraine go further by applying to join nato, Russia could apply crippling economic sanctions, including cutting off energy supplies or blocking trade. The ice age that would descend is suggested by the withering view a bipartisan task force for the U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations recently took of what Russia has already done in Ukraine: "A country that has in the space of a single year supported massive fraud in the elections of its largest European neighbor and then punished it for voting wrong by turning off its gas supply has to be at least on informal probation at a meeting of the world's industrial democracies."

Reunification

Other neighbors are uncomfortable, too. Russia and Germany agreed in the final days of Gerhard Schröder's Chancellorship to build a pipeline bypassing Poland — thus making it possible to turn off energy supplies to Poland without affecting Germany. Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski likened the deal to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact carving up his country on the eve of World War II. He was more diplomatic in an interview with Time last week, saying: "I'm glad Russia has put energy security on the agenda of the G-8. It's a crucial issue for all of us."

Not every nation that looks at the new Russia does so drenched with suspicion. Germans still feel grateful to Russia for not trying to derail unification. The country depends on Moscow for one-third of its gas, and the proportion is rising. German banks and companies are a major source of foreign investment in Russia, Ukraine and Eastern Europe, where turmoil could be costly and disruptive. Not surprisingly, "we have a realistic partnership with Russia, with good cooperation on economic matters," says Ruprecht Polenz, head of the Bundestag's foreign-affairs committee. "When you have good cooperation on the economy, there are opportunities for both sides." Alexander Rahr, a Russia specialist at the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, says economic issues have come to predominate. "Merkel can't conduct a pro-human rights, pro-ngo policy toward Russia because then how can she defend German business?"

Yet even Merkel, raised in East Germany, publicly criticized repression in Chechnya while meeting with Putin in Moscow. She is "cooler and more pragmatic" toward Russia than Schröder, says Rahr. Polenz argues that her government "is more clear-eyed about Russia's record on democracy and freedom of expression, not to mention Chechnya." Despite Germany's interest in placating Russia and doing business there, Merkel would never think of giving Russia a free hand in its own backyard — a second Yalta, as some Russian commentators have called it. Nor could any other G-8 leader. Secret deals to divide up the world "just aren't how Western governments or public opinion work nowadays," says Lyne.

There's no simple way to solve the complex challenges a buoyant but flawed Russia poses. And it's worth remembering that today's Russia is a very different beast from the old Soviet Union, with its aggressive military posture and proselytizing ideology. That's why every G-8 leader, from the time Mikhail Gorbachev first inched down the path of perestroika, has concluded that the wisest course is to help Russia help itself: persuading its leaders that their interest lies in following international norms, while helping them build the domestic institutions and the network of international economic and political ties that such an alignment requires. George W. Bush is no exception. He ran for office proclaiming contempt for Bill Clinton's closeness to Yeltsin, but in office has tried the same dance with Putin — and his aides argue that over Iran, Hamas and North Korea, such an approach is getting results.

Next week George and Vladimir will meet once again. Hard facts will be attractively packaged. Bush is prepared to say that Putin should stop centralizing power, for example, but not because Russia's government is an embarrassment to democracy. Rather, says a senior U.S. official, more centralization will "create a situation where the Kremlin doesn't get the information it needs, won't have the creativity and flexibility it needs to deal with the challenges of the 21st century." If emollience is the approach of George W. Bush, not always known for that attribute, no cold war is in store. But if Russia continues along the path of domestic and foreign policy that Putin has set out, relations between the bear and its G-8 partners are unlikely soon to be warm.