Why Hizballah Can't Be Disarmed

So if Hizballah can't be forced or pressured to change its ways, what's left? The answer is as old as diplomacy. In addition to sticks, it can be offered some carrots--and that's what appears to be happening. The U.S., working with European and moderate Arab countries, is trying to assemble a package of proposals acceptable to the Lebanese and Israeli governments. It includes a cease-fire, the deployment of foreign troops to Hizballah's traditional stomping grounds on the Israeli border with a mandate to let the Lebanese Army extend its jurisdiction there, an end to Israeli violations of Lebanese territory and possibly Israel's agreement to turn over maps of the land mines it left during the occupation. Rice is also encouraging Lebanon and Israel to work out a deal on the so-called Shebaa Farms problem. This tiny patch of territory is occupied by Israel. Historically it belonged to Syria, but Lebanon and Syria now assert that it is Lebanese--providing a pretext for further resistance to the "occupier." If Shebaa is resolved, possibly by Israel delivering it into the hands of the multinational force, Hizballah will be able to claim a proud if insubstantial victory but will have one less reason to keep fighting.

With the addition of a prisoner exchange, the Lebanese government--including its Hizballah ministers--backs these ideas. "There is total unity [in the Cabinet] about a cease-fire and a package deal," Lebanon's Interior Minister, Ahmad Fatfat, told TIME. That position was confirmed to TIME by sources speaking for Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who is in hiding to avoid Israeli assassination.

Not every party has signed up to the same package. In particular, Rice won't push a prisoner exchange unless Israel agrees. In Israel the package deal might look like rewarding Hizballah for starting a war. Still, it could also extricate the Israelis from a quagmire, and they can spin their victory too. "Nasrallah will probably give the last speech--a victory speech," says an aide to an Israeli Cabinet minister. "But we'll have managed to chop off his hands. It will take years for him to make up the damage we're causing his organization."

For Hizballah, renouncing arms to become just another Lebanese political party would be a complete reversal. More militant factions could easily splinter off. Certainly Iran and Syria will want to keep proxies able to make mischief in Lebanon. Hizballah's endorsement of the Lebanese government's package deal could also be a ruse. After Hizballah ministers had signed up to it, Nasrallah appeared on TV, threatening more rockets on Israel. "I'm sure Hizballah is saying yes to buy time," says a senior Lebanese source. "They don't intend to disarm. They are smart."

So the package deal may come with a lot of loose ends--and people who want to pull at them. Progress in the Middle East has always started with small steps, compromises with unsavory enemies, ambiguous words that might evaporate or, with luck and hard work, be made to stick. If Hizballah can't be eliminated, whatever chains it can be made to wear must be slipped on slowly, using a lot of hands. That's diplomacy. If the process looks ugly, the alternative can be viewed in the rubble and graveyards of Beirut and Haifa.