How to Prevent Iraq From Getting Even Worse

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It's not just the politicians who are reassessing the U.S.'s options in Iraq. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has ordered a group of young officers to review the military's strategy in Iraq and ask tough questions. Pace is pursuing the underlying riddle: Why are there almost as many U.S. troops in Iraq now as there were two years ago when, in the interim, more than 300,000 Iraqi security forces have been recruited and trained? Pace, according to an officer familiar with the process, wants to know, What's wrong with this picture?

So what can still be done? Despite the consensus of gloom--Bush told ABC News last week that the violence in Baghdad "could be" compared to the Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968-69, which helped turn many Americans against that war--few Iraqi or U.S. officials believe an immediate withdrawal is wise or likely. But paralysis could be worse. So the focus is on finding ways to bring violence down to a sustainable level, after which the U.S. can begin to extricate itself from the mess. At this late date, there's nothing the U.S. or the Iraqi government can do to stop the bleeding altogether. Iraq's most pressing problems may still take years to resolve. But quick and decisive action in a few key areas could at least help slow the inexorable descent into anarchy. Here are five of them:

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CLEAN OUT THE ROGUES

The Bush Administration's strategy has hinged on standing up credible Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility for the country's security. So far there are 311,000 U.S.-trained Iraqi soldiers and police, of varying capabilities. While that's close to the goal of 325,000, the real problem is less about quantity than loyalty. To anybody paying attention, it's clear that the security forces, broadly divided between the police under the Interior Ministry and the army under the Defense Ministry, are the main vectors of the widening civil war. The bureaucracies and the fighters have been infiltrated by militias, notably the Mahdi Army of Shi'ite radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the Iran-backed Badr Organization, affiliated with the dominant party in the Shi'ite coalition that controls parliament. Many policemen and soldiers are more loyal to their sect leaders and militia bosses than to the Iraqi government. In Baghdad, for instance, many police vehicles and Interior Ministry offices bear stickers and posters of al-Sadr. Sunni victims of sectarian violence routinely accuse the police and army of looking the other way when the militias unleash havoc--or worse, joining in the killing.

Until recently, the government has ignored such allegations, suggesting that the victims were deceived by insurgents masquerading as cops or soldiers. But in the past few weeks, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government has acknowledged that some elements of the security forces have gone rogue. An entire police brigade was suspended this month on grounds that officers were indulging in sectarian or criminal activities, and the Interior Ministry claimed it fired some 3,000 employees and removed from their posts two top police generals.