How to Prevent Iraq From Getting Even Worse

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But that doesn't go far enough. Al-Maliki says the security forces will continue to recruit from the ranks of the militias--leaving ordinary Iraqis feeling that one set of bad cops and soldiers will simply be replaced by another. The only option is for the U.S. to press al-Maliki to abandon his plans to absorb the militias into the security forces, slow down recruitment and set up a screening process to prevent militiamen from infiltrating the ranks. And cops suspected of abuses can't merely be fired. "If these officers and policemen have been guilty of sectarian crimes, they should be in jail and not in the street where they can commit more crimes," says political analyst Tahseen al-Shekhli. "Otherwise, the message al-Maliki sends to every policeman is, 'There is no punishment for killing Sunnis.'"

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DEAL WITH AL-SADR

Since the Feb. 22 destruction of a major Shi'ite shrine in Samarra, the Mahdi Army, al-Sadr's black-clad private militia, has been on the warpath against Sunnis, especially in and around Baghdad. Once driven by anti-Americanism--the Mahdi Army fought pitched battles against U.S. troops in 2004--the militias are fired by a determination to avenge centuries of Sunni oppression. Often with the connivance of the Iraqi security forces, marauding gangs professing loyalty to al-Sadr have killed or kidnapped thousands--not only Sunnis but also Shi'ites who don't subscribe to their radical version of the faith. Al-Sadr's truculence has become increasingly destabilizing. Last week, just days after he met with al-Maliki to discuss an end to sectarian killings, al-Sadr's men battled police and a rival Shi'ite militia and briefly seized control of the southern city of Amarah.

In public, the U.S. military says al-Sadr--who controls a sizable block of parliament--is a major political figure and must be treated accordingly; in media briefings, even al-Sadr's name and that of his militia are studiously avoided. Privately, however, American commanders say they would like the shackles taken off just long enough to deliver some blows against the Mahdi Army. It wouldn't be simple: a full-frontal assault on heavily populated Sadr City isn't a smart option, and a senior U.S. intelligence officer says that "Sadr himself has a diminished ability to command and control his forces." But the U.S. may still be able to do some good by hacking away at those elements of the Mahdi Army responsible for the worst sectarian atrocities and criminal activities. Doing so, however, would require more steel from the al-Maliki government. After the U.S. arrested a top al-Sadr operative in Baghdad last week, a man they described as "the alleged leader of a murder and kidnapping cell" in east Baghdad, the Prime Minister emerged from a meeting with al-Sadr in Najaf to order the man's release.

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BRING THE SUNNIS BACK