Avoiding Iraq Syndrome

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In fact, U.S. diplomacy will in some ways be liberated as American involvement in Iraq recedes. The U.S. could, if it so chose, be an effective proponent for Arab-Israeli peace. If the U.S. and Iran prove able to cooperate over Iraq, they might manage broader talks on other issues that divide them, including Iran's nuclear program. Outside the region, more must be done to lessen the odds that Afghanistan will go the way of Iraq. The Bush Administration could table a comprehensive package of requirements and assurances regarding North Korea and directly negotiate them with its leaders. New ideas could also be put forward about how best to resurrect international-trade talks, tackle global climate change, stop genocide in Darfur and reduce American dependence on imported oil.

Here again, the Vietnam parallel may be relevant. Defeat in Vietnam did not prevent the U.S. from maintaining close cooperative relationships with other regional countries, including Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Nor did it stop the U.S. from forging sometimes productive ties with Vietnam's backers (including China and what was then the Soviet Union) or, with the passage of time, with Vietnam itself. Today Asia is the most dynamic part of the world, and the U.S. is a central participant in that dynamism.

Even more than Vietnam 30 years ago, Iraq constitutes a major strategic setback. There is no getting around this. But Iraq is just that--a setback. What is essential is that the U.S. cut its losses there, contain the consequences and look for new opportunities to advance its interests around the world. The sooner the post-Iraq era of U.S. foreign policy dawns, the better.

Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations