The Next Meltdown

In the world of finance, that was one happy Old Year. Whether they were buying Indian real estate or Brazilian commodities, traders and investors made serious money. Profits at Goldman Sachs exceeded the gross domestic product of Bolivia.

The best explanation for the good times is liquidity. Thanks to global integration and financial innovation, higher short-term interest rates have not translated into monetary tightening. On the contrary, the world economy has been swimming in credit of every conceivable kind. Money-supply figures for the U.S. understate the phenomenon because billions of dollars flow abroad every month to finance the American trade deficit. The world's central banks control about $5 trillion of reserves. This in turn has raised monetary growth rates. The total value of commercial-bank assets worldwide is close to $56 trillion, and bank loans are only one of the many forms credit now takes.

The key question is whether something could happen in 2007 to drain away this liquidity. For most investors and policymakers, the nightmare scenario remains that of the post-1929 Depression, when a stock-market crash was followed by a spectacular wave of bank failures and a massive monetary meltdown. However, by blaming the Hungry Thirties on blunders by the Federal Reserve, we reassure ourselves that history couldn't repeat itself. Today's central bankers are smarter. But history provides an example of another liquidity crisis that went far beyond what central banks could cope with. Until the last week of July, 1914 looked as if it would be another good financial year. The stock-market crash of seven years before had almost faded from memory. Inflation was under control, and interest rates had stabilized. Emerging markets were booming. On the back of sustained global growth, commodity prices were up. Best of all, volatility was as low as most investors could remember. Sound familiar?

It was an act of terrorism on June 28 that began the crisis. At first it seemed like just another assassination in just another Muslim country (Bosnia-Herzegovina, occupied by Austria-Hungary only a few years before). And although the terrorists scored a big hit (Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne), the financial markets took it in their stride. Stocks barely moved.

It was not until the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia on the evening of July 23 that investors began to feel nervous. Its terms were truly formidable, particularly the demand that Austrian officials be allowed into the country to investigate alleged Serbian sponsorship of the terrorists. The government in Belgrade immediately dismissed the ultimatum as "impossible." Germany took the Austrian side; the Russians lined up with the Serbs. By Aug. 4, a little Balkan difficulty had become a full-scale European war.