How to Deal With Hamas

In the scorching heat of the Palestinian territories, you wouldn't think a woolly ski mask would be popular. But for Palestinian militants, the ski mask is an essential fashion accessory, just like the Kalashnikov assault rifle. The mask confers a sinister power, anonymity and a definite edge. The idea is that you don't know who is shooting at you from behind the ski mask, so you can't take revenge.

In Gaza the members of Hamas have stripped off their masks, because they are the victors. For months Hamas and its rival, Fatah, loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas, brawled for power in the Palestinian enclave of Gaza--until June 10, when the shooting erupted into a climactic, vicious battle. Hamas didn't so much destroy the Fatah forces as cow them into surrender: only 5,000 of the 45,000 men on Abbas' payroll actually put up the pretense of a fight. And for the most part, top Fatah commanders deserted their men, either fleeing on foot to Egypt or aboard a small armada of fishing boats.

The war for Gaza is over. After the firing ceased, Gazans dashed to the bazaar to stock up on emergency supplies, certain that Israel would close the borders. Then families flocked to the beach to celebrate an end to months of fighting. The Islamic militants of Hamas--whose charter calls for the destruction of the Jewish state, an aspiration the group has sought to fulfill through scores of suicide bombings against Israel--are now the lords of Gaza, with 1.5 million Palestinians under their rule. The end of the power struggle in Gaza marks the opening of a critical new chapter in the Middle East that could determine whether the entire region can be saved from anarchic internecine warfare. The collapse of Palestinian unity is the latest manifestation of a phenomenon roiling the Arab world: the rise of a generation of angry, hungry and radical young men who refuse to play by the old rules. Until that anger is defused, any prospect of a functioning Palestinian state or a lasting settlement between Israel and the Arabs will stay beyond reach. Figuring out how to deal with that challenge remains among the U.S.'s most pressing foreign policy dilemmas.

There are no easy answers. For the time being, the U.S. is pinning its hopes on Abbas, a moderate secularist who has been the titular leader of the Palestinians since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. Abbas has dismissed the Hamas-led government elected in January 2006 and appointed a new Cabinet of technocrats. To avoid a repeat of Fatah's defeat in Gaza, the U.S. moved swiftly to bolster Abbas in the West Bank by lifting an embargo on aid funds for the Palestinians. The new strategy--shared by the Israelis, the Europeans and the Bush Administration--is to flood Abbas' government with cash and attempt to transform the West Bank, while putting Gazans on a diet of limited humanitarian aid in the hope that they will ultimately revolt against their Hamas masters.

There's just one problem with that strategy: it won't work. The world clamped a boycott on the Palestinians after Hamas' victory over Fatah in the January 2006 elections; but as Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser under President Jimmy Carter, says, that U.S.-Israeli policy "put a lot of pressure on the Palestinians in Gaza, which helped to radicalize them without any compensatory relaxation for the Palestinians on the West Bank." The U.S.'s new "West Bank first" strategy aims to correct that shortcoming, but given the Palestinians' defiant mood, the tardy gift could turn into a nasty surprise for Abbas. Robert Malley, a Middle East expert with the International Crisis Group, says that "we've lost so much credibility among Palestinians that the people we try to help, we hurt, and those we try to hurt, we often inadvertently help."

So what should be done? If the new course charted by Israel and the White House--of coddling Abbas and slapping down Hamas--seems likely to fail, what might succeed? In the long run, squeezing the Gaza Strip won't help moderate Palestinians any more than pushing democracy on them did. Avoiding a takeover of the Palestinian cause by even more radical elements will instead require a more pragmatic and clear-eyed strategy than the Bush Administration has so far pursued. And that means that sooner or later, the U.S. and Israel will have to find a way to engage with Hamas.

GROUNDS FOR COMPROMISE Hamas' vistory has complicated the Bush Administration's hopes of using Abbas as a defense against the rise of Islamic radicalism. After Hamas' triumph in the 2006 elections, Prime Minister Ismail Haniya's government was was denied aid by the quartet--the U.S., the European Union, the U.N. and Russia--for refusing to accept Israel's existence, renounce violence and adhere to past peace accords signed by Israel and the Palestinians. And yet Hamas still gained support, largely because Abbas failed to rid himself of the corrupt officials that had turned the Fatah movement into a band of gangsters and mercenaries. To Palestinians, Hamas seemed disciplined and more honest, and Palestinians blamed the U.S. and Israel, not the Islamists, for the boycott's miseries. Meanwhile, Hamas sought and received backing from two of Israel's chief nemeses, Iran and Syria.

Given that track record, the U.S. and Israel are justifiably reluctant to deal with Hamas. But failing to do so risks strengthening the organization's radical voices. That's why it's time for a different approach--one that can protect Israel's interests while still reaching out to forces within Hamas that might steer Gaza in a more constructive direction. True, Hamas refuses to recognize Israel, but there are some signs that it sees compromise to be in its self-interest. Hamas has reason to avoid provoking Israel--in part because, as Major General Giora Eiland, retired head of Israel's National Security Council, says, "military targets in Gaza just got a lot clearer. There's only one color now--and that's Hamas." On June 20, Israel fired missiles at rocket launchers in northern Gaza and engaged in a firefight with militants, killing four. Hamas leaders know that their first order of business is restoring law and order, not starting a war with Israel. Hamas has tried to pressure other militant cells to stop shooting rockets into southern Israel.

Some Hamas leaders say they may be willing to go even further. A senior Hamas official has told TIME that the militants are prepared to talk with both Israel and Washington. "We hope that the Americans will stop being guided by Israel," the Hamas official said. "And instead of going through the Saudis and the Egyptians, they should talk directly with us. We may disagree, but we are prepared to meet them."