Turkey's Great Divide

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Eksioglu himself is an example of how the AKP is drawing from an ever wider pool of supporters. Traditionally, AKP supporters hailed from central Anatolia or the sprawling, working-class suburbs of big cities like Istanbul. But Eksioglu is conspicuously uptown. His family's property-development firm has flourished under AKP rule (it has put up four buildings since 2002, vs. none in the previous political term), thanks to a stable economy and lower interest rates that have made buying homes easier for ordinary residents of Istanbul. He now owns an apartment on Baghdad Avenue, the smartest address in the city, lined with designer shops and sushi bars. And while secularists once made fun of AKP officials for their brown, poorly tailored suits, Eksioglu adopts a cooler style with a fashionably unshaven jaw, shorts and a Led Zeppelin T shirt or, while campaigning, a sharp suit. To the consternation of local secularists, plenty of young, prosperous Turks, who also happen to be religious, are rallying to the AKP. One of the best known cafés in the area, in a former Pasha's palace overlooking the Bosporus, a place once reserved for wine-sipping secularists, now serves no alcohol; its female patrons, wealthy as ever, are as likely to cover their hair as not.

To understand why Turks are voting for the AKP in such numbers, visit Pursaklar, a hillside town just outside Ankara in the brown hills of central Anatolia. Ten years ago, the place was an afterthought, its small population made up mostly of poor migrants from rural parts of central and eastern Turkey. Today it is a booming residential center of 120,000, with 10,000 more arriving each year, according to its AKP mayor. The town boasts two new parks, a town square redesigned around an imposing new mosque, and a factory-sized cultural center (with separate facilities for men and women). There are no fewer than 14 supermarkets in the town, up from two in 2000.

Locals credit their town's rebirth to AKP policies and, in particular, the party's economic management. After a financial crisis in 2001 caused Turkey's currency to lose half its value, the country introduced IMF-inspired reforms that the AKP has doggedly maintained. As a result, Turkey has not only experienced impressive gdp growth, but has rid itself of the hyperinflation that plagued it for most of the 1990s. For real estate agent Abdullah Cam, 23, who says his family firm has tripled revenues in the past five years, the AKP has been "great for business." Down the road, Mehmet Goktas, 41, agrees. Sales at the supermarket he owns have more than doubled in the same period. "We've moved from an inflation-based economy to a normal one," he says. Both Cam and Goktas consider themselves "very religious" and both come from conservative families who were drawn to the AKP for its "Islamic values," but it's the party's economic record that has sustained their support.

Secularists may fear for their Western lifestyles, but very devout youngsters, for their part, see in the AKP potential relief from Turkey's remorselessly secularist laws. Mine Karakas, 27, has worn a head scarf since the age of 10 and as a result was prevented from attending university. (Head scarves are banned in public buildings.) She protested the law, picketing the university gates for two years, but eventually gave up. She headed to the U.S. to study instead, but returned after 9/11. She now works for a private foundation that operates Muslim orphanages around the world. For her, the religious values of Erdogan and Gul are reassuring: "We feel more comfortable with them." How such sentiments will play out at the polls remains unclear. Public opinion surveys put support for the AKP at 35-42% vs. 18-25% for the CHP and 15-25% for the MHP, an overtly nationalist party that has benefited from Turkish anger over the Iraq war, fears of Kurdish separatism, and frustration over resistance to Turkish membership of the E.U. The two opposition parties have not ruled out forming a coalition in order to replace the AKP — if they get the votes.

One irony is that the policies of the Islamic AKP are significantly more pro-Western than those promised by its secularist and nationalist rivals. A coalition of the MHP and the CHP may keep head scarves out of the presidential mansion, but it might also put the brakes on European-inspired democratic and economic policies, jeopardize talks to join the E.U., and lead to a clampdown on Turkey's Kurdish minorities. The AKP, if elected, vows to press ahead with additional requirements of E.U. accession, whether or not the Europeans are willing to let Turkey join. The party also promises to nearly double personal annual incomes to $10,000, and raise national gdp from $400 billion to $800 billion by the end of its next five-year term. "Then," says Gul, "I don't think France or Austria or anyone else will be able to ignore Turkey."

In the meantime, the nation can take heart from the fact that young Turks are so deeply engaged in determining their country's future. In Kadikoy, Utku Koseoglu says he has no regrets about his decision to stop partying and focus on the less frivolous pleasures of getting out the vote. "Rallies are fun," he says. "It's as if we've all known each other forever. We can thank the AKP for one thing: they got us out in the streets."