Pre-Emptive Strike

The remarkable courage shown by Burma's marching monks last September captured the world's imagination. The protests encouraged Western governments, many of which first imposed economic sanctions against Rangoon a decade ago, to broaden those measures; the E.U., for example, has now banned a far wider range of exports from Burma.

Sadly, this strategy will prove as ineffective as past such actions against the junta. Sanctions that only heap more restrictions on Burmese exports will have no impact on the ruling generals. The junta has demonstrated that it does not care about Western opinion and has no genuine interest in dialogue. Indeed, negotiations between the generals and democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, which were jump-started by the U.N. after the September protests, have stalled, and many dissidents have been rearrested. On Feb. 9 the junta said it would hold a referendum on a new constitution in May and hold a general election in 2010, but the new constitution effectively bars Suu Kyi from political office and the last time the junta held a general election, in 1990, it refused to recognize the victory of the National League for Democracy, Suu Kyi's party.

The generals, thus, are not to be trusted. Instead, the outside world needs to hit them directly in their pockets, where they are vulnerable, while avoiding collateral damage to the wider Burmese population. Lower-profile financial measures also will appeal to China and to ASEAN, which is allergic to public shaming of the junta. Singapore, ASEAN's current chairman, has ruled out either imposing new sanctions or booting Burma out of ASEAN.

The junta and its business allies do not save their money in Burma's shambles of a banking system; they stash their hard currency in offshore centers. Tough but quiet financial sanctions, focusing on freezing assets of a list of junta leaders and their allies, could cut off the generals' income with little cost to average Burmese. These measures have worked against tyrants before; they disabled Serbian tyrant Slobodan Milosevic's finances and put pressure on North Korean strongman Kim Jong Il — after Washington publicly identified a bank in the Chinese territory of Macau as a major conduit for North Korean money, the bank froze many North Korean accounts.

Along with a financial crackdown, an international arms embargo against the generals would have an impact without causing wider pain. Without new weaponry provided at discount rates, the junta would have to spend vastly more of its own money equipping the second largest army in Southeast Asia. This would leave far less to support the military's vast parallel social-welfare system, including separate health care and schools for soldiers, which is vital to ensuring the average grunt's loyalty to the generals rather than to the Burmese people.

A comprehensive embargo, led by Asian nations, also would allow the U.S. to step back from the public face of pressure on Burma. The junta, always on the lookout for "neocolonialism," could not portray the action as simply the West ganging up on poor Burma.

After last fall's crackdown, India promised to stop arms sales to Rangoon. China could be persuaded to go along. Beijing has already cut off non-humanitarian aid to other rogue nations like Zimbabwe. As with Burma, Robert Mugabe's regime stained China's international image; Beijing also fretted that unrest against the Mugabe government might spark local anger at Chinese interests. Chinese diplomats privately admit that Beijing fears that violent instability in Burma might threaten Beijing's investments — in October, with Burmese resentment of China soaring, gunmen fired on the Chinese consulate in Mandalay. Embargo commitments by those Asian giants would push the junta's other weapons suppliers to fall in line, or risk standing alone in their support for the generals.

Of course, launching quiet, targeted measures does not mean that international ngos and activists should refrain from publicizing the junta's atrocities or stop offering moral support to suffering Burmese democrats. Public-attention campaigns, followed inside Burma through foreign radio stations, give courage to Burmese dissidents. They keep Burma's cause in the world's media. They engage a new generation of human-rights activists around the globe. But moral support alone cannot triumph in a fight against an immoral regime. Putting the squeeze on the generals' cash is different. That would truly be payback.