A Matter Of Faith

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The Birth of a Nation
As empires fell to the nation state in the early 20th century, Muhammad Iqbal, a Sufi poet and philosopher, saw an opportunity in the coming independence of India to put into practice his theories of modern Islamic governance. He proposed an Islamic nation carved from the Muslim-majority provinces of northwest and northeast India. "The movement for the formation of Pakistan was not based on religious extremism or emotionalism," says former Supreme Court judge Javid Iqbal, Iqbal's son. "It was to be a modern state, adhering to modern interpretations of Islam, particularly of Islamic laws." Iqbal believed in the sanctity of the religious obligations: prayer, pilgrimage to Mecca, tithing and fasting in the month of Ramadan. But the laws governing everyday affairs, such as crime and punishment, marriage, economics and inheritance, were open to change. "Iqbal maintained that those Koranic punishments — cutting off hands, stoning — were meant for the community from which the Prophet descended," says son Javid. "In the modern era these laws were not meant to be strictly enforced." In short, Iqbal sought an Islamic reformation through the establishment of a Muslim state. The idea was repugnant to conservative Muslims, literalists who held that the Prophet's laws could not be changed, and who called Iqbal's idea heresy.

Iqbal never lived to see his ideas put into practice. He died nine years before Pakistan became independent on Aug. 14, 1947. Ever since, Pakistan has staggered between bouts of inept civilian government punctuated by military coups. In 1971, East Pakistan seceded in a brutal civil war that saw hundreds of thousands dead. Religion, which Iqbal theorized should have no place in government, was an easy source of political legitimacy for leaders struggling to hold what was left of the fractious country together. The success of Ayatullah Khomeini's Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran eight years later launched a revival of conservative Islam, including in Pakistan. Elements of Shari'a were implemented. Iqbal's son calls it the revenge of the orthodoxy. "They were saying, 'You used Islam to carve out a state. Alright, we will make it Islamic.' That launched the struggle between modernists and conventionalists."

The conventionalists gained the upper hand after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis charged across the border to aid their brothers in defending Islam, and Muslims around the world cheered the success of the mujahedin. The religious groups that backed jihad were given political prominence, and their coffers swelled with contributions and fees earned for training and supplying jihadis. The moderate religious groups who refused to sanction killing, even in the defense of Islam, were punished with political purgatory, from which they have yet to emerge.

The Shari'a Dilemma
Once unleashed, it is nearly impossible to put the genie of militant Islam back in the bottle. Even Pakistan's moderate Muslims are caught in the middle. Islam has never been decoupled from Shari'a, and though few Pakistanis see the Taliban period in neighboring Afghanistan, in which women were stoned for adultery and thieves faced the amputation of hands, as the ideal Islamic state, they feel conflicted about throwing it out entirely. "Hardly any Muslim will say, No, I do not want Shari'a," says Najam Sethi, a top Pakistani newspaper editor. "To say that would imply negation of your religion."

As Pakistan's black-suited lawyers took to the streets last year to protest Musharraf's dismissal of the Supreme Court — which was poised to invalidate his October re-election by a then pliant parliament — the call for Shari'a grew louder. Pakistan's justice system — slow, corrupt and usually anything but just — had earlier commenced a quiet renaissance. But a new court was installed, stacked with judges who signed an oath of loyalty to Musharraf. The court has little credibility with the Pakistani public, who see the whole episode as yet another confirmation of a corrupt justice system, where those in power make the rules. Shari'a, whose supreme authority is God, not a President, is increasingly seen as a solution to Pakistan's problems. In a recent survey, 60% of Pakistanis said they wanted Shari'a.

"This isn't a religious revolution," says retired Brigadier Shaukat Qadir, who, like many other analysts, says most Pakistanis don't really understand what Shari'a is. "It is a good-sounding word because it comes from the Prophet. It's a safe word. But what people want really is the rule of law. Equality. That there be no discrimination between a brigadier and a laborer when it comes to law. That does not exist right now in Pakistan."

Most of Pakistan's ultraconservative groups have sought, unsuccessfully, to install an Islamic government and Shari'a through elections. The problem, says Sami ul-Haq, head of one of Pakistan's largest religious parties, is that most conservative leaders share the sentiments of the militants. "The extremists are saying that the government has not allowed us to implement Shari'a through peaceful means. They say, 'You have tried yourself and failed completely. So it is time to vacate the stage for us,'" says ul-Haq. "The problem is that we cannot condemn them because they have a valid argument."

Moderates that should be condemning terrorism have a dilemma, too. What keeps otherwise moderate Pakistanis from denouncing extremist leaders such as Osama bin Laden is a deep-seated distaste for both Musharraf and the U.S. The President's call for "enlightened moderation" was well received in Washington, but in Pakistan, where his ham-fisted attempts to stay in power have earned him widespread opprobrium, it was perceived to be a cynical, and successful, bid for support from the West at the expense of his own people. "There has been a failure in our Islamic obligation to condemn people like Fazlullah and Mehsud," admits Al-Ghazali, the imam of Islamabad's Faisel Mosque. "But you know the man who is championing this anti-extremism cause is a very unpopular man. Musharraf is identified with this cause so much, that if they initiate a move against this extremism, they are perceived to be supporting the government and Musharraf."

The American Factor
More worrying still is the Pakistani conflation of extremism on their soil with the American war on terror. The suicide attacks against police, the military, government ministers and moderate leaders are not seen as attacks on Pakistan, but as a reaction to American adventurism in the region. There was a time in the 1950s and '60s when Pakistanis would proudly boast that they were America's 51st state. No longer. American support for Israel, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing tensions with Iran are taken as proof that the U.S. is following an anti-Islamic agenda. Pakistanis point out that before Musharraf dragged Pakistan into America's war on terror, there were no suicide bombers.

Terrorism, indeed, is proving to be an effective means to advance the religious cause. In Swat, a picturesque valley that has been besieged by Fazlullah's militant forces, the government has proposed the implementation of Shari'a. Bhutto's husband and de facto successor, Asif Ali Zardari, says he will eschew the military option in favor of dialogue with militants in the restive tribal areas along the border. That approach could work, but it requires the Pakistani people to take a firm position on who takes control of their religion. The extremists have already shown that they are willing to die defending their brand of Islam. Now it is up to the moderates to respond. It's going to be a long war. How it ends may depend on whose faith is stronger.