Measuring Iraq's Security Forces

Throughout southern Iraq, members of the police and army are drawn largely from the Badr Organization, the chief rival of al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. That's why it was no surprise, said Lieutenant Ryan Lawson, who is based in Hilla, that the Shi'ite town's Badr-dominated forces were "chomping at the bit to go after [the Mahdi Army]" in recent fighting. In areas where al-Sadr's militia dominates, many soldiers simply deserted, either out of loyalty to the cleric or out of fear. "Most of the officers are scared that if they attack the militias and the Mahdi Army today, they'll pay for it tomorrow," says a senior Interior Ministry official. "Power could flip, and the Mahdi Army could be in control. Then anyone who is fighting them now will end up in jail, accused of war crimes."

American commanders would like to see more Sunnis in the Iraqi forces and are pressing al-Maliki to recruit more of the former insurgents to fight alongside U.S. troops; there are now some 90,000 such fighters, and their salaries, paid by the U.S., start at $300 a month. But the Iraqi government regards their loyalties as suspect and has dragged its feet in recruiting them.

Back in the village outside Mahmudiya, Zemp doesn't wait around for the Iraqi troops that are catching the extra z's. He continues with his patrol, bolstering his U.S. platoon with a handful of Iraqis in mismatched uniforms and a secondary commander. When the other members of the contingent arrive hours later, they march down the dirt path that has already been patrolled by U.S. troops, only to be called back and redirected. Their commander greets Zemp with a shrug. "I was sleeping," he says nonchalantly. For the U.S. military, however, the Iraqi battlefield performance in recent weeks should serve as a wake-up call.