Afghanistan: A War That's Still Not Won

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But because the Taliban controls the only road leading into Kajaki, all the equipment and all the labor have to be flown in by helicopter. John Shepherd, who manages the project for the Louis Berger Group, which was contracted by USAID, says he would be ready to push the start button today if it weren't for the security problems. His warehouse in Kabul is packed with hundreds of crates of equipment that have to be transported to Kajaki, along with some 300 tons of cement. It would take a convoy of trucks just a few days to bring the materials to the site; by helicopter, it will take several months. Some essential pieces are simply too heavy to be airlifted, like the four 30-ton transformers. "Luckily, they are the last components to be installed," says Shepherd. "We are hoping once we get that far along in the project the security situation will have changed."

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The Challenge of Helmand

But if the situation is changing at all, it is for the worse. In May monthly foreign casualties in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq for the first time since 2003. On June 13 hundreds of Taliban escaped in a daring jailbreak in Kandahar city; many joined an audacious attack on a strategic district just outside the former Taliban capital a few days later. Though Afghan National Army forces, backed by NATO troops, were able to contain the assault, it was a stark reminder that the Taliban, declared all but dead in 2002, remains resilient. A campaign of kidnappings, targeted assassinations of government officials and suicide bombings throughout the south has belied claims that stability and security are on the way.

Military officials say the insurgency doesn't have the numbers to win a conventional fight. But the Taliban doesn't need to win. It just needs to outlast the will of foreign nations. Few Afghans believe that the Taliban offers a better alternative to the current government, but many are convinced that it will be around longer. When foreign troops can't even clear a 25-mile (40 km) road through Taliban country to deliver equipment to the dam project, it's little wonder that villagers along the route aren't willing to stand up against the insurgents in their midst. "Until we establish security, the dam will do nothing to win the loyalty of the local population," says Captain Doug Beattie, a British soldier who has done two tours in Kajaki. It is the classic counterinsurgency conundrum: to win the support of the population, you must deliver development, but development can't take place without security, and security is dependent on popular support. "We have to persuade them that we can provide security 24 hours a day and that they can tell the Taliban, 'We don't want you here,'" says Beattie. "[But] we don't control enough of Helmand to influence how the people think."

There are only 8,500 British troops in Helmand. According to U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, Helmand needs at least 25,000 troops to be secured--nearly half the foreign forces in Afghanistan. NATO officials call the effort in Afghanistan an "economy-of-force operation," meaning that the few troops available have to be applied strategically. In Helmand, that means troops are concentrated in urban areas. In Kajaki, according to Lieut. Colonel Joe O'Sullivan, commander of the 2nd Parachute Regiment, of which Shervington's troops are a part, "the force there at the moment is sufficient to defend the base of the dam and to keep control of the 2.5-mile [4 km] circle of ground there. It is not designed to do any more than that."

Just a few miles down the road from where Shervington stopped to talk with the farmer is Kajaki Sofla, a bustling town on the banks of the Helmand River that is the local Taliban headquarters. It holds the region's largest bazaar, an essential stop for daily necessities like tea, oil and sugar. To get to the bazaar, travelers must pass through a Taliban checkpoint, where they are taxed and interrogated. Those suspected of collaborating with the British are beaten, or worse. Shervington can do nothing about it. All he can do is pace his area of operations like a caged lion, impotent against the Taliban forces taunting him on the other side of the bars. "We talk a great game about delivering schools and clinics, but we do nothing," he tells his soldiers at a postpatrol debriefing. "People want security. Unless we can give them something permanent instead of handouts, they will move out."

The lack of electricity throughout Afghanistan has been a source of constant frustration. Industries are forced to generate their own power, cutting into payrolls; this means they can't pay the kinds of salaries that could keep young men away from the Taliban or the opium trade. Without the Kajaki power station, southern Afghanistan cannot escape the quicksand of a drug-funded insurgency. "There are two or three things that can really change people's lives, and one of them is having electricity," says the U.N.'s Alexander. "Once work begins on a larger scale, it will show that this is really about improving the life of the people, and that's where we start to win."

But so far, few in Helmand believe that the West is that committed; even engineer Baqi is skeptical. When the first turbine began to be rehabilitated in 2004, Shepherd provided him with spare parts and explained the importance of routine maintenance. A few years later, Shepherd, the project manager, noticed that the parts had gone unused. Baqi was hoarding materials, assuming that "at some point, we were going to leave, and that he would need these spare parts to keep the place running for the next 30 years," Shepherd says. Baqi has seen power change hands so many times that he knows its hold is tenuous. But until Afghans like him believe there can be lasting change, there won't be any.

On the Front Lines For more photos of the British operation in Helmand province, go to time.com/helmand